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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
International trade in services has been a major concern among politicians and 
economists from all over the world and especially from members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). This apprehension gave birth to the General Agreement in Trade 
in Services (GATS) whose main goal was to encourage and promote international 
competition in trading in services among WTO nations. Until now, despite some 
restructuring of many service sectors in a number of countries, including many of the 
WTO states, barriers to international competition still exist. Global competition does 
not subsist in any of the world's services' markets, and export of services has not yet 
been fully considered. 
Many service markets are still dominated by state monopoly power. We know 
from basic economic theory that a monopolist charges a price higher than marginal 
cost, and as a result, the government monopolist will not provide low-cost efficient 
services and a deadweight loss occurs. Some economists argue that the best solution to 
such inefficiency is to remove trade barriers and promote international competition. 
This would lead to lower prices and more efficient services to the residents of the home 
country. Others favor international competition but within certain limits, such as the 
imposition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Many countries follow the latter 
opinion and adapt commercial policies that limit the access of foreign suppliers of 
services to the domestic market. In some nations, there exist laws and regulations for 
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foreign suppliers of services. Among those are licensing fees and market share 
restrictions. Within this context, there is little difference between the trade protection 
tools applied to services and those applied to goods. Indeed the policy tools used for 
trade in services restriction consist of measures such as tariffs, subsidies, quotas and 
other commercial policies. However, as Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997) point out, 
there are some basic differences between the characteristics of a service and those of a 
regular good. Goods are often tangible and they do cross borders when trade occurs. 
Therefore, in the case of regular goods, ad valorem tariffs as well as quantity quotas are 
easy to apply. In the case of services, there is not any physical object that crosses the 
border when trade occurs. Custom agents do not observe the flow of services on the 
border; they only observe the flow of suppliers or consumers of those services. In most 
cases, the value of the service will not be known until it is produced and consumed, 
therefore it will be difficult for tariff collectors to know and charge the exact amount of 
tariff that should be paid by the supplier of the service. 
On the Issue of Trade in Services' Barrier Policies 
The application of barriers to trade in services can be challenging but still 
feasible. The first category of barriers is composed of quantitative restrictions. 
Quantitative restrictions are often used to limit trade in services, but since services are 
intangible, quotas are usually applied to the suppliers of services, and in the extreme 
case, foreign supply of services is just forbidden. An example of such a restriction is the 
banking sector, where the number of foreign banks in some Middle Eastern and African 
countries is restricted and even in other countries, foreign banking or foreign 
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telecommunications services providers are prohibited. In those extreme cases, the major 
problem is not due to differences in comparative advantage among trading partners, 
rather, it is because of the internal structure of the market. The financial and 
telecommunication sectors in most of those nations are not privatized or liberalized; 
they belong to the government. 
The second category of trade barriers falls within the price-based policy 
instruments like tariffs. An import tariff is a tax applied on the price of the good 
imported to the home country. Within the context of trade in services, tariffs are 
generally applied to the movement of persons across nations. Within this policy 
scheme, countries can increase the visa fees depending on the nature of the visit of the 
person. Another application of the tariff within the context of trade in services is when 
a nation imposes a tariff on the input used for the production of services. An example of 
such an application is the tariff on computers and telecommunications equipment. 
The third category of barriers is composed of policies whose main objective is to 
control prices. Nations who apply such policies are usually state-owned monopolies. 
Under this system the government fixes the maximum or the minimum prices that a 
local firm can charge for certain services. Examples of services subject to such a 
pricing rules are the financial, telecommunications, and transportation services. 
The fourth category of barriers to trade in services embrace licensing and 
procurement. Most of developing nations require a license or certificate in order to 
provide a certain service. Examples of services subject to licensing include medical, 
transportation, telecommunication and financial services. In the case of 
telecommunication and financial sectors, this type of restriction acts as a limitation vis 
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a vis the network globalization. In fact this could protect local carriers and discriminate 
against foreign companies. Licensing constitutes a major barrier to foreign investment 
in telecommunications and financial services. In fact, in order to evaluate investment 
opportunities, investors look at several factors, among them are the freedom in pricing, 
competition, laws, regulations, and taxation. The presence of licensing would play a 
role in deterring foreign investment in the services sector. In many instances, the 
government can also necessitate that the provider of the service meet certain technical 
standards. Governments can also require that the foreign provider of the service be a 
partner with a national firm or person to ensure that part of the revenues generated from 
the supply of the services stays in the home country. Shin Cho and Myeongho (1997) 
list the status of foreign ownership restriction in the Asian Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Group. Among those countries, there are still four nations (Brunei, China, 
Indonesia, Taiwan) in which foreign ownership is not allowed. They also argue that the 
status of foreign ownership restriction often reflects the stage of telecommunication 
development. Indeed, many developing countries (among those are Indonesia and 
Thailand) have implemented the "build, operate and transfer" (BOT) scheme. Within 
this scheme, foreign companies build the infrastructure, run the network and share the 
revenues with the local public firms, and then after a period of time, the foreign carrier 
transfers the facilities to the local public firm. Another type of foreign integration is the 
joint venture. This kind of foreign participation is mainly found in developing countries 
where the local carriers need some kind of technical assistance. With the foreign help, 
the developing country gets some technological expertise, through which it will 
develop into a technological transfer. Those types of foreign participation play an 
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important role for international market integration. On the other hand, they represent a 
restriction for foreign investment typically through partial control of the network 
instead of full control. 
Other types of trade obstruction include structural and behavioral barriers. Some 
services sectors require investments in sunk costs which may be high enough to deter 
entry into a foreign market. Behavioral barriers are usually from within the country. 
An example of behavioral barriers is the discriminatory access to the 
telecommunications network or the incompatibility of the existing incumbents' 
technology with the potential foreign entrant. This conduct would occur when a 
dominant telecommunication carrier would discriminate against new entrants by 
imposing limitations to the new provider on the types and quantity of equipment that 
they can attach to the incumbent's network. This is a way to force the incoming firm to 
invest in its own interconnecting network and construct additional infrastructure. 
On the Issue of the Impact of Service Trade Liberalization 
In addition to the physical difference between goods and services, the policy 
implications and the impact of full liberalization in the services sector differ from those 
of any regular tangible goods sector. As Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2001) 
argue, there are two major effects encountered when liberalizing a certain sector. Those 
effects are disaggregated into static and dynamic effects. For both services and goods, 
the static effect is similar; it constitutes a decrease in prices and an improvement in 
welfare. However, the dynamic effects of liberalization are not the same. In case of 
services, the spillover of technology and skills due to factor mobility of the supplier of 
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services will enhance the domestic productivity leading to an increase in domestic 
output. The second dynamic effect is rather precarious. It reflects the fact that the 
impact of liberalization of the services sector on the growth in output can be segregated 
into two effects. The first impact is summarized by the fact that domestic employment 
in the service sector that is being liberalized can either improve or not improve 
depending on the market structure of this service. The second impact reflects the 
increase in productivity of labor in the home country. Figure 1.1 shows the flow and 
exchange of telecommunications and financial services between the home country and 
the rest of the world. 
Degree of Openness In the 
Telecommunlcalions Seclor 
.. 
•o,. 
o, 
... 
. ,.. 
Home Country 
Static Effects: 
Prices Decrease and Welfare 
Improves 
Dynamic Effects: 
Ambiguous Effect on 
Employment, but 
roductivity Increase 
Rest of The World 
Degree of Openness in the 
Financlal Services 
Figure 1.1. Services Factor Flows and the Effects of Service Trade Liberalization 
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For simplification, the only factor flows to be considered are the ones from the rest of 
the world to the home country. Whether the home country follows the path of global 
international competition or the restricted competition, openness of international 
services markets would stimulate economic growth through technological transfer and 
positive externalities. 
On the Issue of Concerns Raised from Liberalization 
Aims at liberalizing the services sectors raised several issues. One of the 
important concerns is the sovereignty of the home country. Many nations are concerned 
about their sovereignty when it comes to trade negotiations and policy reform. Usually, 
economists are mainly in favor of efficiency and optimal welfare results. However, not 
all policymakers are first and foremost concerned about efficiency. Instead they appeal 
to sovereignty to argue against international competition and an open market economy. 
Shin Cho and Myeongho Lee (1997) gave the example of China. Chinese policy 
makers tried to allocate the foreign participation in building an urban network in a 
certain way such that there won't be any market power acquired by a foreign company. 
Another issue that is usually brought into negotiation is the competition with the 
domestic labor. As mentioned before, the effect of liberalization of the services sector 
on the domestic employment is ambiguous. Depending on the internal market structure, 
the home employment level can either benefit or lose from an openness policy. It is true 
that import of services can eliminate some of the domestic service sector jobs, but this 
does not mean that the total number of jobs available for the domestic population has 
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decreased. International trade theory taught us that the loss of jobs in one industry is 
usually compensated by a gain of jobs in another industry. 
On the Issue of Preferential and Regional Agreements 
During recent years, many countries have been engaged in regional agreements to 
liberalize their services. Examples of recent services trade agreements include the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), and the European Union agreements with several neighboring 
countries. The main concern is whether preferential agreements bring more welfare 
improvements to the home nation than non-preferential agreements. Mattoo and Fink 
(2002) highlight the impact of a regional agreement compared to the one of a global 
agreement. They argue that compared to the status quo, a nation is likely to benefit 
from a preferential agreement rather than staying without any accord. Compared with 
non-preferential agreements, regional agreements produce less welfare gains because 
preferential agreements result in a consumer choice bias. However, regional agreements 
might be more desirable because of political considerations or because of the regulatory 
harmonization among neighboring countries. 
Objective of the Study 
The main objective of the dissertation is to measure the effect of globalization of 
trade in services on the world's economic growth. In this study, only two sectors are of 
major interest, telecommunications and financial services. The analysis starts by stating 
conventional international trade and economic growth assumptions and tries to work out 
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the empirical implications and impacts of openness of those two services sectors on 
economic growth. The specific objectives are the followings: 
To measure the effect of openness in trade of telecommunication services and 
financial services on economic growth. 
To determine whether the level of nations' development affects the impact of 
openness in trade of telecommunication and financial services on economic 
growth. 
To estimate simultaneously demand and supply equations and respective 
elasticities for the telecommunication and financial services sectors. 
To measure the effect of openness in telecommunication services on the financial 
services sector. 
An econometric model will be built whose main purpose is to estimate the effect 
of openness in trade of telecommunication and financial services on economic growth 
and to measure the cross sectoral effects of the openness in the two services industries. 
Indeed, many researchers have stated that openness of international telecommunications 
markets would stimulate economic growth through technological transfer and positive 
externalities, but there has not been any estimate of the magnitude of those cross sectoral 
externalities. In this study, the externalities will be estimated and the effect of 
globalization in both sectors will be determined. Another contribution of this study is that 
the model will be estimated simultaneously to account for endogeneity. Previous studies 
have not taken into account the endogeneity problem within their estimation. 
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Plan of the Study 
The content of the dissertation is as follows: chapter two contains a literature 
review of previous studies done in this field. Chapter three presents the theoretical 
framework as well as the behavioral models used for the empirical estimation. Chapter 
four sketches the estimation methodology, an overview of the data used for estimating 
the model, and the results of the estimation. Chapter five divulges some policy 
implications and concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORICAL AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been a voluminous amount of research on the costs and benefits of 
liberalizing trade in goods, and little analysis on the effect of services trade integration 
on economic growth and welfare. This is not surprising since services constitute a new 
dimension in regional and multilateral trade agreements. In what follows, a distinction 
will be made between studies done in the field of trade in goods and studies done in the 
area of trade in services. 
Trade in Goods and Economic Growth 
Most economists agree that international trade is an important factor in building 
an economic system, and that trade policies are fundamental items in every economic 
plan. Because of international trade, economic agents can specialize in the production 
of goods in which they have a comparative advantage, and use the revenues generated 
from these activities to buy products in which they have a comparative disadvantage 
from foreign producers. The law of comparative advantage was born after David 
Ricardo's critique of Adam Smith's theory of absolute advantage. Smith's theory of 
absolute advantage, based on the labor theory of value, stated that with free trade, 
nations could emphasize the production of goods they can make most economically. 
According to Smith, absolute cost differences will direct the flow of goods among 
countries. The major drawbacks of the theory of absolute advantage is that Smith's 
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concept of cost was based on the assumption that labor is the only factor of production 
and that the price of a product is based on the amount of labor used in the production 
process. Disgruntled with the law of absolute advantage, Ricardo developed the theory 
of relative advantage to show that even if other nations have absolute advantages in the 
production of most consumable goods, a country can still benefit from trade. The basic 
idea behind Ricardo's theory is that nations should search for the relatively efficient not 
just the absolutely efficient. Mutually beneficial trade can still occur even if a country is 
absolutely less efficient than the other nation. 
Throughout recent history, policy-makers have attempted to produce efficient 
trade policies that can boost economic growth. However, there is not a consensus 
among economists regarding the effect of openness in trade on economic growth. Some 
of them believe that economic policies oriented towards openness are beneficial for 
developing countries, others reject this hypothesis. According to Baldwin (2003), there 
are several reasons for this disagreement. The first and most important reason is the 
difference in the way economists define and treat the question that is being 
investigated. Some researchers are concerned about the impact of outward-oriented 
policies on economic growth; others are looking at the causal relationship between the 
increase in trade and the increase in growth. On the other hand, the interpretation and 
definition of openness differ among authors. Many authors measured openness by the 
ratio of the sum of imports and exports to the gross domestic product (GDP). This type 
of interpretation of openness has some problems. One of the problems is that import 
and export measure the flow of trade between countries, and trade flows are not a 
perfect measure of trade policies. However, the main reason for using such a measure 
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of openness is because of availability of data on imports, exports and GDP. Other 
measures based on trade shares include the deviation from predicted trade (Balassa, 
1985), and the changes in trade shares (Helliwell and Chung ,1991). Other type of 
openness measures include price based and administrative policies, export growth and 
changes in import shares 1• The interpretation of openness can include broader terms 
such as taxation, education system, competition and market structure, the government 
structure, the legal system, the freedom level as being reflected by the civil rights, the 
number of "couts d'etat" that the nation has had previously, and the characteristics of 
institutions and cultures. Another reason for the disagreement among economists 
regarding the effect of openness in trade on economic growth is reflected by the nature 
of the data and the econometric approach that researchers use to test their models. 
Because of some missing data, authors tend to use proxies that might not measure 
exactly the variable of interest. This might cause inaccurate conclusions and policy 
implications. On the other hand, econometric techniques such as panel data and cross-
country estimations have been criticized because of the fragile theoretical foundation as 
well as the lack of quality data. 
In what follows, a survey of different views regarding openness and growth will 
be presented. The survey will pursue a historical pattern, starting from the aftermath of 
the World War II where the import substitution concept was the prevailing policy in 
developing countries, then presenting some aspects of the export-oriented policies 
which dominated policymakers between 1970's and 1990's, and ending with the 
1 For a comprehensive study of openness measures and their association between openness and economic 
growth, refer to Harrison (1996). 
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prominent study of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) where they argue that the evidence 
linking trade barriers and economic growth is erroneous. 
Import Substitution After World War II 
After the World War II era, a pervasive view was developed among economists 
and policy makers with regard to trade policies. The prevailing trade policy for 
developing countries was import substitution. Developing countries sought to 
emphasize industrialization by implementing import substitution policies. Such a trade 
policy involves a wide utilization of trade barriers to stimulate internal industrial 
production and protect such industries from foreign competition. Examples of such 
policies include tariffs and import quotas. The argument was that the use of tariffs and 
quotas on imported goods would protect the domestic industry from foreign 
competitors by increasing the price of foreign competitors charged in the domestic 
market. This rationale can be emphasized more with the infant industry argument. 
Protecting newborn industries will allow them to grow and become competitors with 
the old industries of the foreign countries. It holds that a country might have a 
comparative advantage in a product, but because of the lack of experience and skills, it 
cannot compete effectively with the already established foreign competitors. Therefore, 
a nation should temporarily protect its newborn industry with inward-oriented strategic 
trade policies until it matures and become stronger to face foreign competition. 
However, the infant industry argument can be justified only if the cost of protection on 
domestic consumers is less than the discounted returns of the grown-up protected 
industry. Offsetting the major acceptance of this argument by economists and policy 
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makers, the infant industry argument drew many critics. One of the criticisms is that 
domestic producers will have no inducement to improve their efficiency because of the 
lack of foreign competition. Another concern was related to the fact that domestic 
producers will not be able to take advantage of economies of scale since most of the 
domestic markets in developing countries are relatively small. Another criticism is that 
nations can adopt an equivalent subsidy to the infant industry instead of implementing 
trade restriction policies. A subsidy would avoid the relative price and consumption 
distortions, thus lowering the welfare cost of infant industry protection. 
The impact of import substitution policies on economic growth was positive only 
m the short run. The long run effects of such inward-oriented policies were an 
overvalued currency as well as a decrease in economic growth. Baldwin (2003, pp.7) 
argues that the main reasons for the long run failure of import substitution policies is 
that economists accepted the infant industry argument without questioning it and the 
fact that they did not look at the macroeconomic outcome when those policies were 
applied to all manufacturing industries. 
Export Promotion and Outward-Oriented Policies 
A seminal study at the National Bureau of Economic Research directed by 
Krueger and Bhagwati changed the way economists look at trade policies. Bhagwati 
(1978) and Krueger (1978) concluded that import substitution policies contribute 
positively to economic growth only in the short run; those policies do not contribute to 
a sustainable long run economic growth; as would outward-oriented and liberalization 
policies. 
15 
After the failure of the import substitution policies in the long run, economists 
started to look at outward oriented policies during the 1970-1990 period. They thought 
that international trade could have positive effects on economic growth, especially in 
developing countries. The first effect is that trade will move the nation from 
underemployment to full employment by a reallocation of the unemployed resources 
into the export industry. The second effect is related to Smith's theory of division of 
labor. Indeed, with trade a nation can expand the size of its market and benefit from 
economies of scale through the specialization of its labor. One can mention the cases of 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. However this argument should be considered with 
caution. As Balassa (1971, pp.27-28) mentions, the impact of policies on economic 
growth depends heavily on the size of domestic markets. In some cases, small 
developing countries would not be able to achieve economies of scale comparable to 
that of developed countries. The third effect is reflected through the transmission of 
technology and skills, which makes developing countries more productive in the 
production of manufactured goods. Neoclassical models of growth which were initiated 
by Solow (1957), treated technology as exogenous, independent from any other 
variable like the openness to international trade. Critics of the Solow model led 
economists to pursue more in-depth research and to develop the new growth theory 
where technology is treated as endogenous, depending on several variables. The theory 
of endogenous growth was mainly strengthened by the work of Romer (1986) and 
Lucas (1988) by making this theory more rigorous and giving it a stronger conceptual 
framework for the long run analysis of trade policies and growth. A fourth impact is 
that international trade can smooth the progress of capital from developed to 
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developing countries. Finally, trade can boost competition and make domestic 
producers more efficient in order to meet foreign rivals. Competition can drive down 
the prices and increase the welfare of the domestic nation. 
Economists began investigating those effects through empirical research. A 
number of studies emphasized the role of international trade and competition m 
economic growth. Dollar (1992) studied the effect of openness on economic growth 
with a sample of ninety-five less developed countries. He concluded that trade 
liberalization and other openness policy reforms can increase economic growth in poor 
countries. This would imply that countries with policy environments conducive to 
openness and globalization have a greater chance to grow more rapidly. Edwards 
(1993) reviewed much of the empirical literature concerning trade policies and growth. 
He criticized the early cross-country studies by stating that they do not have a strong 
theoretical ground and that they are erroneous because of econometric issues. In his 
conclusion, he suggests that there are still some missing channels that researchers 
should investigate. There are still unexplained results such as the channels through 
which openness policies would affect economic growth. Edwards also suggests that 
researchers should focus on developing more reliable measures of trade policies, but he 
acknowledges the fact that measures of trade policies without any measurement errors 
will not be found. During the 1984-1995 period, economists tried to build different 
openness indices that measure levels of openness. Harrison (1996) collected some of 
those measures for a cross section of developing countries over time and tested whether 
these measures give the same results. Among those measures are the ones based on 
trade shares, the ones based on the price, and the ones based on microeconomic and 
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productivity studies. She found that the consistency of those measures depends on the 
time period of interest. Different measures showed different result with respect to 
growth. The least robust measure of openness was the trade share. However Harrison 
argues that her results were robust because in cases where openness was statistically 
significant, she found that more openness leads to higher growth. Edwards (1998) used 
a panel data for 93 countries over the period 1960-1990 in order to investigate the 
relationship between openness and the total factor productivity growth. Edwards 
concluded that openness contributes positively to the productivity and growth of an 
economy. However, Edwards emphasized that further work needed to be done in this 
domain in order to understand the transmission mechanism from innovation to 
openness and finally to growth. Frankel and Romer (1999) studied the effect of trade on 
income for a sample of countries. They concluded that trade does have an effect on the 
improvement of the standard of living of economies. More recently, V amvakidis (2002) 
questioned the evidence of trade liberalization and growth. In his paper, V amvakidis 
estimates the role of trade protection on growth using historical data from 1870 to 1990. 
His main conclusion is that the positive correlation between growth and openness only 
holds for recent decades. 
In most of the reviewed papers, three issues have been noted. First, many 
economists agree that there should be more search for an accurate measure of openness. 
Second, there is not a general agreement regarding the causality effect between growth 
and openness. Some results show that the causality runs in both ways. More open 
regimes lead to more growth, but also higher growth rates lead to more openness. 
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Third, separating long run from short run effect is an important attempt when analyzing 
the effect of openness on economic growth when using cross sectional time series data. 
The Openness-Growth Relationship Paradox 
In their paper "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the 
Cross-National Evidence", Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) argue that the evidence 
linking trade barriers and economic growth is flawed. The main issue that the authors 
were questioning is whether countries with more openness to international trade 
experience faster growth. In their analysis, the authors criticize the following papers: 
Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Ben David (1993) and Edwards (1998) in 
addition to Frankel and Romer (1999) and Lee (1993). 
Their main argument is that the conclusion that most research economists have 
about the relationship between trade barriers and economic· growth is based on 
inaccurate empirical measurement of trade barriers. For instance, in order to measure 
the outward orientation of countries, Dollar (1992) constructs two indices, the real 
exchange rate distortion and the index of real exchange rate variability. Dollar argues 
that his index originality is that it reflects the price level that corresponds to a country's 
resource endowment. Real over-valuation or under-valuation is measured relative to the 
norm and provides an indication of the extent to which incentives are geared to the 
domestic or the international market. Thus, this index measures the extent to which the 
real exchange rate is distorted away from its free trade level by the trade regime. On the 
other hand, in their paper " Economic reform and the process of global integration", 
Sachs and Warner (1995) construct a zero/one index of openness. Their index combines 
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several criteria of trade restriction policies; among them are the average tariff rate, the 
economic system, the state export system, the black market premium and others. 
Another study by Edwards (1998) used alternative ways to measure openness. Edwards 
tested the significance of nine indicators of openness and then chose the most 
significant ones to use in his regression. He concluded that there is significant proof 
that there is a positive relationship between openness and economic growth. On the 
other hand, Ben David (1993) studied the effects of trade policies on income by 
questioning whether trade openness and liberalization will reduce the dispersion of 
income levels. In order to do this analysis, he used the convergence hypothesis and 
found that there is no systematic relation between trade liberalization and convergence. 
The critique by Rodrik and Rodriguez (1999) was mainly about the way those 
researchers measured trade openness. They argued that most of those measures and 
indices reflect criteria other than the trade openness of nations. Some of the constructed 
indices would explain macroeconomic imbalances and inappropriate institutions, other 
like the deviation of domestic prices of tradable goods from world prices reflects 
mainly the deviation from the purchasing power parity and is not a measure of trade 
barriers. One can argue that Rodrik and Rodriguez' arguments are valid. In fact those 
indices do measure aspects other than trade openness. On the other hand, we have seen 
empirically that many states who have inappropriate institutions, who experience high 
market premiums, who have a big deviation of their domestic prices of tradable goods 
from world prices, who have high levels of tariffs, and many other aspect of 
macroeconomic imbalance and other economic problems do have high barriers to trade, 
whether it is in a form of policy restriction or in any other form. Therefore, it would be 
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difficult to identify and separate those measures from the ones that reflect the real trade 
barriers, and it would be very hard to come up with measures that would take in 
consideration all the aspects that Rodrik and Rodriguez mentioned in their critique. 
Trade in Services and Economic Growth 
On the Difference Between Goods and Services 
Early research on trade in services focused on the applicability of the classical 
international trade in goods theory on the service sector. However, questions were 
raised on whether traditional trade in goods theories are applicable to the services 
sector. One economist who emphasized the difference between goods and services is 
Hill (1977, pp 336) who states that goods and services fit in different categories. Since 
both commodities belong to different groups, one can argue that the traditional theory 
of international trade cannot be applied to the service sector. However, Hindley and 
Smith (1984, pp 386) claimed that there is no reason why the traditional theory of trade 
would not be applied to the service sector. On the other hand, Melvin (1989) shows that 
Hindley and Smith's argument is not valid. Melvin built a simple two factors, two 
goods model of trade in services and showed that the principle of comparative 
advantage and the Heckscher Ohlin theorem necessitate different interpretations from 
the ones in the traditional trade in goods models. He also showed that commercial 
policy has a different effect depending on whether the imported commodity used the 
mobile or immobile factor intensively. Trade patterns, according to Melvin, cannot be 
determined in cases where both commodities are tradable, and furthermore the standard 
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commercial trade theory might have different welfare effects. In a recent NBER 
working paper, Bhattarai and Whalley (1998) question the difference between the gain 
from liberalization of network-related services and the gain from liberalizing goods. 
They argue that smaller countries gain higher per capita benefits than larger countries in 
case of expansion of their networks where network externalities exist. The authors also 
argue that the benefits from liberalizing trade in services can be of equal size across 
large and small countries, in contradiction with the standard trade in goods theory, 
which predicts that the small country will have higher gains than the large one. 
According to Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2001), the difference between the 
impact of services trade liberalization and goods trade liberalization on economic 
growth is due to two major reasons. Firstly, in many countries, barriers to entry in many 
service sectors are maintained not only against foreign suppliers, but also against 
potential domestic suppliers. Liberalization of those sectors can create more 
competition from both domestic and foreign suppliers. Secondly, trade in services 
requires mobility of factors that lead to scale effects, whereas trade in goods does not 
necessitate movement of factors. Jones and Ruane (1990) looked at the difference 
between liberalizing the service factors and liberalizing the service product. They 
conclude that in the context of perfect competition, liberalizing both factors and 
products will have a positive impact on welfare. 
On the General Agreement in Trade in Services 
During the last decade of the twentieth century, members of the World Trade 
Organization were concluding their negotiations with a new agreement on trade in basic 
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services. The aim of this agreement was to promote international competition as well as 
to impose new rules in order to ensure a competitive environment for international trade 
in services. The agreement contains a set of schedules of promises. These promises 
concern mainly national market access by foreign competitors, and treatment equal to 
local incumbents for foreign service providers. In addition, most members added some 
regulatory comments to the schedule. The main point of these new regulations was to 
address the issue of the dominance of the local incumbents and to ensure a competitive 
atmosphere within the international services market. 
Even though the agreement covered many conditions regarding competition and 
local market access by foreign service providers, there were many criticisms raised. 
Economists and lawyers argued that the agreement lacked sufficient precision. For 
instance, the concepts used in the document were neither precise nor very clear. In 
addition, according to Bloin (2000), the agreement did not resolve lucidly the issue of 
state sovereignty vis a vis the trade rules. Other concerns embrace the limited scope of 
liberalization and the sectoral approach to competition rather than a horizontal approach 
to domestic and foreign competition regulation. 
In brief, participants were mainly afraid of a decline in revenues in the domestic 
services sector, the control of their local infrastructure as well as the protection of their 
national sovereignty. Regardless of these concerns and fears, the agreement was a first 
step toward a complete harmony and synchronization for a competitive trade in 
services. 
However, until now, the basic issues have not been applied widely. Many of the 
members of the WTO, who signed the agreement, still have market barriers to foreign 
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competition. As a result, the degree of competition and the magnitude of globalization 
differ among WTO economies. Global services competition does not exist, and export 
promotion of services has not been fully adopted yet. 
Empirical Research on Trade in Services 
Despite the fact that services account for a large share of income in many 
countries, empirical studies on the impact of services trade policies on economic 
growth is relatively limited. Early research on trade in services concentrated on the 
financial sector. In Financial Structure and Development, Goldsmith (1969, pp. 390-
409) argues that predicting and studying the causal relationship between financial 
structure development and economic growth is very difficult and uncertain. Goldsmith 
states that the conclusions economic historians have made regarding the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth cannot be generalized; for their 
conclusions reflect only the time period and the countries studied. Expanding on 
Goldsmith's (1969) research, economists have been able to provide additional evidence 
that there is a positive relationship between the level of development of the financial 
structure and economic growth. Indeed, Rajan and Zingales (1998), King and Levine 
(1993), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) all find a positive relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. Since there is evidence that financial 
structure development contributes to economic growth, one can hypothesize that 
liberalization of financial institution and openness to international trade in financial 
services would also contribute to growth. Levine (2001) analyzed this hypothesis and 
concluded that international financial liberalization spurs long run economic growth in 
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developing countries. He argues that liberalizing the financial system and allowing 
foreign banks to enter the domestic market will foster a more efficient domestic 
banking system, which will have a positive influence on productivity and growth. 
Many researchers wrote survey papers in which they analyze trade liberalization in 
services. Hoekman and Primo Braga (1997) surveyed the literature on trade in services. 
They argue that experience shows that restrictions and barriers to trade in services can be 
costly and that liberalization can add efficiency and welfare gains. They concluded by 
stating that globalization of trade in services remains a big policy issue. Primo Braga 
(1996) analyzed the impact of globalization of services in developing countries. His main 
point was that information technology plays an important role in facilitating trade in 
services and this is why developing countries should remove their barriers to trade in 
telecommunication services. Many economists tried to explain the contribution of 
technology to growth. Jones (1998) argues that technology transfer plays an important 
role in growth. In fact, both the Solow growth model and the new endogenous theory of 
growth taught us that the growth rate of an economy depends heavily on the growth rate 
of the technology. 
Other studies emphasized the role that telecommunications investment plays in 
economic growth. Madden and Savage (1998) studied the relationship between growth of 
fixed investment, telecommunication infrastructure investment and economic growth for 
a sample of 27 countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Their findings stress the fact 
that telecommunication infrastructure investment is an important factor for economic 
growth. They conclude that countries should create a positive environment to promote 
and encourage international investment in telecommunication infrastructure. This would 
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increase the aggregate investment and hence strengthen the causation effect between 
investment and growth. Roller and Waverman (2001) also analyzed the effect of 
telecommunication infrastructure on economic development. In their study, they used a 
simultaneous equations approach in which the supply and demand of telecommunication 
infrastructure and investment respectively are endogenous in the model. Their main 
contribution was the use of a micro model which was jointly estimated with a macro 
production function. They found a causal relationship between telecommunication 
infrastructure and national output. 
Studies of the impact of service trade liberalization on economic growth include 
Matoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2001) and Verikos and Zhang (2001). Matoo, 
Rathindran and Subramanian studied the impact of service trade liberalization on 
economic growth by proposing a measure of openness of a country's services regime and 
constructing such measures for the telecommunication and financial services sectors. 
They ran a cross-country regression for a sample of 60 countries and found that openness 
in trade in services has an impact on the long run economic growth. Stronger evidence 
was found for the financial services, and weaker evidence was found for the 
telecommunications sector. Their estimates suggest that countries with full liberalization 
of the telecommunication and financial services sectors will have a growth rates up to 1.5 
percentage points higher than those with more conservative regimes. On the other hand, 
Verikios and Zhang (2001) estimated the global gains from liberalizing trade in financial 
and telecommunications services by using a computable general equilibrium approach. 
They argue that if countries remove all barriers to trade in telecommunications, there will 
be an increase of 0.1 % in the world real GNP. On the other hand, they found that 
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removing all barriers to trade in financial services would also increase the world's real 
GNP by 0.1 %. According to their model, the benefits from liberalizing both sectors are 
reflected by an estimated increase of the world real GNP by $US 48 billion. Those 
benefits are distributed to almost all regions; developing countries with high barriers to 
trade in services capture the highest gains whereas developed countries with low barriers 
capture the smallest gains. 
A recent paper by Whalley (2003) discusses current literature on liberalizing trade 
in services. Whalley argues that despite the fact that researchers have built complex 
quantitative models trying to predict the impact of services trade liberalization on 
economic growth, the big picture reflecting the impact of openness in the services 
industry remains cloudy and confusing. He states that current results appear to be 
contradictory, especially for developing countries. The main reason for those inconsistent 
results is due to the approaches researchers take in modeling the restrictions for trade in 
services. Other problems emerge from the interpretation of empirical results. Whalley 
argues that the positive effects on economic growth from openness in trade of services 
might be due from savings and investment following openness rather than the increase in 
the use of services after globalization. However, it would be difficult to measure the 
direct effect of liberalizing trade in services independently. 
Many economists argued that promoting telecommunication competition has a 
positive extemality. For instance, telecommunication networks enhance the financial 
system by creating a virtual financial world. Aronson (1997) analyzed how the new 
globalization of networks is transforming the financial industry. He concludes that 
although the technology improvement is enhancing the financial sector there is still a 
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big need for open markets and competition in the telecommunications services industry. 
However, Aronson did not estimate the magnitude of those cross-sectoral externalities. 
A study by Deardoff (2001) explains one of the channels through which liberalizing 
trade in services benefit the world. Deardoff argues that services are usually used to 
facilitate trade in goods and hence liberalizing trade in services will lead to a reduction 
in the price of services which lead to a greater consumer surplus. 
The work in this dissertation improves upon existing studies by usmg a 
simultaneous equation model where two micro economic models are estimated 
simultaneously along a macro production growth function. Using such an approach to 
model the effect of openness in trade in services on economic growth will give 
enhanced econometric results due to the accountability of simultaneity. This study also 
builds upon previous research by considering the effect of development on the impact 
of openness on economic growth as well as the effect of development on the supply of 
banking services. In addition, the study measures the extemality effect of the openness 
in telecommunication services on the supply of financial services. The following 
chapter presents the theoretical framework upon which the empirical model will be 
structured. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODEL STRUCTURE 
Model Overview 
The model, which is designed to show how openness in trade of services affects 
economic growth in the presence of factor mobility, is constructed following Roller and 
Waverman (2001) approach 1• In order to address this question, two microeconomic 
models of supply and demand for telecommunication and financial services will be 
incorporated within the model. The main assumption is that the telecommunication and 
financial sectors affects economic growth through the openness in international trade 
channels. Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic components of the model. There are five 
fundamental elements that constitute the model. Those elements are economic growth, 
openness in the telecommunication sector, openness in the financial sector, the market 
for telecommunication services and the market for financial services. Both the 
telecommunication and financial services markets have an impact on economic growth. 
Openness in trade of telecommunication services and openness in trade of financial 
services sectors have a direct effect on economic growth as well as on their respective 
markets. Since the main objective of this study is to measure and estimate the impact 
of openness in trade of services on economic growth in the presence of factor flow, it is 
important to identify an accurate measure of economic growth before proceeding to the 
next step of model construction. This will be the purpose of the following section. 
1 Roller and Waverman's (2001) goal was to investigate how telecommunications infrastructure affects 
economic growth. They did not look at the issue of openness in trade of telecommunication services. 
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Search for an Accurate Measure of Economic Growth 
This section sketches the theoretical framework behind the use of the growth of the 
gross national product as a dependent variable in the growth equation used in the study. 
First assume there are several nations in which the main factors of production are 
telecommunications capital (TEL), financial capital (FIN) and other capital (K), along 
with labor (L). Drawing on Boamet (1998) and Yilmaz, Haynes and Dine (2002)2, the 
output in each of those nations is represented by a continuous production function of the 
following form: 
(1) Y = a(TEL)/J(FIN)f(K,L) 
where, Y is output, a , /J , and f are continuous functions such that 
a'(TEL)>O,/J'(FIN)>O, fK >0, fKK <0, fL >0,and !LL <0. 
The marginal product of each factor of production is calculated as follows: 
~ = a'(TEL)/J(FIN)f(K,L) 
8TEL 
~ = a(TEL)/J'(FIN)f(K,L) 
8FIN 
ay = a(TEL)/J(FIN)fK(K,L) 
aK 
ay = a(TEL)/J(FJN)fL (K,L) 
aL 
Assuming the markets are perfectly competitive and the labor and capital markets are 
mobile within each country, then each factor of production will be paid its marginal 
2 For a deep review of model specification, refer to Boamet (1998). Yilmaz, Haynes, and Dine (2002) 
used Boamet model in order to estimate the spillover effects of telecommunications infrastructure. Their 
study was done for the United States. 
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revenue product. In fact the first-order condition of the profit maximization function 
leads to: 
r/EL = pa'(TEL;)/J(FIN;)f(K; ,L;) 
rtN = pa(TEL;)/J'(FIN;)f(K;,L;) 
where are the prices of output, labor, other capital, 
telecommunications capital, and financial capital in country i. 
Taking the first partial derivatives of w;, r/, r/EL, r/1N with respect to TEL and FIN leads 
to: 
aw. (2) ' = pa'(TEL;)/J(FIN;)fL(K;,L;) > 0 
8TEL; 
(3) Br/ = pa'(TEL;)/J(FIN;)fK(K;,L;) > 0 
8TEL; 
8 FIN 
(4) r; = pa'(TEL;)/J'(FIN;)f(K;,L;) > 0 
8TEL; 
(5) aw; = pa(TEL;)/J'(FIN;)fL (K;,L;) > 0 
8FIN; 
(6) a::. = pa(TEL;)/J'(FIN;)fK(K;,L;) > 0 
l 
Br.TEL 
(7) ' = pa'(TEL; )/J'(FIN;)f(K.,L;) > 0. 
8FIN; ' 
Our main goal is not to study spillover effects of the telecommunications and financial 
infrastructure among countries, rather equations (2) through (7) were derived in order to 
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show that when we have an increase in capital investment, whether it is in 
telecommunications or financial services, the prices of factors of production increase in 
the short run leading to a movement of factors of production from the nation with a lower 
return on capital to the nation with a higher one, assuming again capital mobility. An 
interesting result from equations (4) and (7) is that the change in the rent of financial 
capital from a given change in telecommunications capital investment is equal to the 
change in the rent of telecommunications capital from a given change in the financial 
capital investment, ceteris paribus. This means that the cross rental effects of 
telecommunications and financial capital investments are the same. This result is derived 
from Young's theorem which states that the cross partial derivatives of a continuous 
function are equal. In our case the parent function is the profit function from which we 
obtained the first order conditions. An implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is 
that in the long run, the relative factor prices will equalize. In our case, when we consider 
the trade in services, we should also be concerned about factor mobility. In fact, 
exporting telecommunication or financial services to a foreign country reqmres 
investment in capital infrastructure. 
Since our main objective in this study is to measure the economic growth effect of 
openness in trade of services in the presence of factor flow, we should look for a 
dependent variable proxy that will measure accurately the growth effect when factor 
mobility is assumed. Considering GDP growth as our proxy for economic growth 
measure would either overstate or understate our evaluation depending on whether the 
home country is a net importer or a net exporter of services. Therefore, an appropriate 
measure for economic growth in the presence of factor mobility would be the GNP per 
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capita growth. Since the main purpose of this study is to analyze the openness effect on 
economic growth, the appropriate variable of interest would be the GNP per capita 
growth. 
The Behavioral Models 
The models are constructed following the approach of Roller and Waverman 
(2001). First we will construct the national production growth functions by having the 
growth of GNP as the dependent variable. Then we will proceed by defining the micro 
models of supply and demand for the telecommunications as well as the financial 
services sectors. Within this framework, the telecommunication services as well as the 
financial services sectors will be endogenized into the aggregate growth production 
function in order to control for the causal effect. 
A Behavioral Model for the Telecommunication Services Sector 
Since our main objective is to test for the relationship between growth and 
openness in trade of telecommunication services, a growth production function will be 
specified as follow: 
(8) Gj = f(Xj,InvJel ,OpJe/) 
where G1 , the dependent variable, is the growth rate of per capita GNP in country j, Xj is 
a vector of growth control variables for country j, Inv;"' is the investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure in country j, and OpJe1 is an index of openness in trade 
of telecommunications services. Equation (8) relates the national growth aggregate 
activity to growth control variables, the investment in telecommunication infrastructure 
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and the index of openness in trade of telecommunication services. The coefficient on 
Inv in equation (8) accounts for the one way causal relationship between the investments 
in telecommunication infrastructure and the growth in gross national product. Since 
investment in telecommunication infrastructure depends on other explanatory variables, 
we specify three other equations that will endogenize the demand and supply of 
telecommunication services. 
Since by definition, the market demand is the total quantity of a good that the 
consumers are willing and able to buy, demand for telecommunication services is usually 
inferred by the number of subscribers in different telecommunications services plans and 
the number of potential consumers who are waiting for their application to be processed 
in order to be connected to the service network. Hence, the demand for 
telecommunication services equation will be specified as follows: 
(9) Tel j = h( GDPj I POPj, Pt1, POPj) 
where Tel j is the local telecommunications demand for country j , GDPj I POPj is the 
gross domestic product per capita for country j, and Pt1 is the average price of 
telecommunication services in country j, POPj is the total population in country j. 
Equation (9) states that the demand for telecommunication services is a function of per 
capita GDP, the average price for telecommunication services and the total population. 
In order to specify the supply behavioral function, we need to consider the open 
economy case as opposed to the closed economy case. In an open economy, the market 
supply of a certain good is defined as the sum of the domestic supply of the good and 
imports of the same good. Hence in order to specify the market supply function, we 
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need first to specify the import behavioral function. Domestic imports of 
telecommunication services: 
(10) M?1 = g(GDPj,Pf"\Exj,Op?1,Tel) 
where M ;e1 and Ex j are the import of telecommunications services and the exchange rate 
respectively. Equation (10) provides for the relationship between imports of 
telecommunication services and some exogenous variables that will explain the changes 
in imports in the telecommunication services sector. It is important to note that equation 
(10) provides also for the income and price elasticities of demand for telecommunication 
services. 
Supply of telecommunications services will be defined as follows: 
(11) s;e1 = u(Pf"1 ,GAj,WL5et ,Op?1) 
where s;ei is the supply of telecommunication services m country j, GA j is the 
geographic area of country j, and WL5ei is the waiting list for connection to 
telecommunication services in country j. Equation (11) represents the supply of 
telecommunication services as being a function of price of telecommunication services, 
the geographic area of the country, the waiting list for connection, and the openness index 
for trade in telecommunication services. Figure 3 .2 shows a schematic representation of 
the behavioral model for the telecommunication sector. Notice that there are two 
independent variables; the telecommunication infrastructure investment and the waiting 
list are used also as a variable of measurement for the dependant variables; supply and 
demand for telecommunication services respectively. 
The next section presents a behavioral specification for the financial services sector. 
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Figure 3.2. The Behavioral Model for the Telecommunication Sector 
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A Behavioral Model for the Telecommunication and Financial Services Sector 
In this section we build a model where both the telecommunication and the 
financial services sectors are integrated within the model. The only modification is in the 
aggregate national production growth function where the growth in GNP is expressed as 
a follows: 
Equation (12) states that the growth in GNP is a function of growth control variables, the 
investment in telecommunication infrastructure, an index of openness in trade of 
telecommunication services, and an index of openness in trade in financial services. 
Demand for financial services is specified as follows: 
where Fin 1 is the demand for financial services in country}, r1 is the real interest rate in 
country}, andlnf1 is the inflation rate in country j. Equation (13) states that the demand 
of financial services is a function of the real interest rate, the inflation rate, GDP per 
capita and the total population in the country of interest. It is important to note that 
equation (13) accounts also for the interest elasticity of the demand for financial services. 
The behavioral function for the supply of financial services is as follows: 
(14) st= m(GA1 ,y1,0pt ,r) 
where st is the supply of financial services m country}, y 1 is the initial income. 
Equation (14) states that the supply of financial services is a function of the geographic 
area, the initial income, the openness in trade of financial services and the real interest 
rate of the country of interest. 
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To complete this model, we should represent it along with equations (9), (10), and (11). 
This model provides for the endogenous relationship between the aggregate national 
growth production function, the telecommunication as well as the financial services 
sectors. In this way, we will be able to investigate the effect of interaction between the 
two sectors on economic growth. Figure 3 .3 shows a schematic representation of the 
behavioral model for the telecommunication and financial sectors. As in the previous 
model, the two independent variables telecommunication infrastructure investment and 
waiting list enter as proxies for measurement of the supply and demand for 
telecommunication services respectively. In addition, the quantity demanded of 
telecommunication services 1s an explanatory variable for the import of 
telecommunication equipment, and import of telecommunication equipment enters as a 
variable of measurement for the supply of telecommunication services. The difference 
between this model and the previous one is that in this representation, the financial sector 
is incorporated within the model through the addition of the supply and demand of 
financial services equations. It is worth noting that the demand for financial services is 
also an explanatory variable for the welfare growth. Because of the interdependent 
structure of this model, it would be important to take into consideration a simultaneous 
econometric methodology when estimating this model. 
The following chapter will discuss the data and the methodology for the 
econometric implementation of the discussed models. 
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Figure 3.3. The Behavioral Model for the Telecommunication and Financial Sectors 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY, DATA AND RESULTS 
The Effect of Openness in Telecommunication Services on Growth 
Methodology 
The empirical implementation of equations (8), (9), (10) and (11) involves the 
estimation of the following system of equations: 
GNP growth equation: 
(8') Gj = a0 + a1 lnGovj + a2 Infj + a3 popj + a4 lnlnv?' + a5 ln0pj + a60p?' 
+ a7[ln(y j )op;e/] + e} 
Demand for telecommunication services equation: 
5 
(9') ln(ISub;j + WLj) = b0 +b1 ln(GDPj I POPj) + b2 lnPt' +b3 lnPOPj + eJ 
i=l 
Import of telecommunication equipment equation: 
lnM?1 = c0 +c1 lnGDPj +c2 lnPt' +c3 lnExj +c4 0p?' 
(1 O') s 
+ c5 ln(ISubij + WLj) + e} 
i=l 
Supply of telecommunication services equation: 
where Gjis the average annual growth rate of per capita GNP 1 based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) for country j, Govj is the average of the government consumption to 
1 The average annual growth rate of per capita GNP was computed for each country as follows: 
(ln GNP2000 - ln GNP,. 989 ) /12 
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GDP ratio for country j, Infjis the average inflation rate based on the GDP deflator, 
pop j is the average annual population growth rate for country j, Inv j is the average 
annual telecommunication equipment investment for country j, Op j is a measure of 
openness to international trade for country j which is computed as the average of the ratio 
of the sum of export and import to the GDP. Op;ei is an index of openness to international 
trade in telecommunication services which takes values from 1 to 9 with higher values 
indicating more openness. Since the effect of openness of telecommunication services on 
the GNP growth depends on the level of development of each country, an interaction 
variable representing the product of the initial GNP ( y j) by the openness index of 
telecommunication services ( Opiet) was implemented in the regression. It is important to 
note that the interaction variable provides also for the convergence rate. Since under 
certain situations, less developed countries tend to have a higher rate of growth in GNP 
than more developed countries, we expect that the coefficient of the interaction variable 
( a 7 ) to be negative. The coefficients in front of the government consumption to GDP 
ratio ( a 1 ), the inflation rate ( a2 ), and the population growth rate ( a 3 ) are expected to be 
negative. The coefficient in front of the investment in telecommunication infrastructure 
( a4 ) is expected to be positive. Following the openness and growth past evidence, as 
discussed before, most of the previous researchers have found that openness in 
international trade does contribute to growth. Hence we expect the coefficient in front of 
the openness index ( a5 ) to be positive. 
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Equation (9') estimates the demand for telecommunication services in country j. 
5 
The dependent variable L sub if represents the average sum of the number of subscribers 
i=I 
in each telecommunication service in country j. Telecommunication services include 
cable television, cellular mobile telephone, integrated services digital network, telex and 
telephones. Since the market demand includes also the potential consumers who are 
willing to buy the services, we added to the sum of subscribers in different services the 
number of people waiting for their application to be processed in order to be connected to 
public switched telephone network (WL). Variables that explain the demand for 
telecommunication services include the average per capita GDP ( GDPj I PO~) for 
country j, the average price of telecommunication services in country j ( Pt1 ) and the 
total population of country j ( POPj ). The average price of telecommunication services 
was computed by dividing the average total revenue from the telecommunication services 
5 
by the sum of the average total number of subscribers in each service ( L Sub if ). 
i=I 
Assuming that telecommunication services are normal goods, we expect the coefficient in 
front of the average per capita GDP ( b1 ) to be positive, the coefficient in front of the 
average price ( b2 ) to be negative, and the coefficient in front of the average total 
population ( b3 ) to be positive. 
Since we are dealing with an open economy case, the supply of 
telecommunication services depends on the imports of those same services. Hence we 
endogenized the import by estimating it empirically within the model. We used the sum 
of investment in telecommunication infrastructure and the import of telecommunication 
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equipment as a proxy for supply of telecommunication services. Equation (10') provides 
an estimation of the import function. The variable Ex.i is the average official exchange 
rate. We expect that the coefficient in front of per capita income ( c1 ) to be positive, the 
one in front of the average price ( c2 ) to be negative, the one in front of the average 
exchange rate ( c3 ) to be negative, the one in front of the openness in trade of 
telecommunication services ( c 4 ) to be positive and the one in front of the sum of the total 
subscribers and the number of people waiting for connection ( c5 ) to be positive. 
Equation (11 ') provides an estimation of the supply function where GA.i is the 
average geographical surface area measured in square kilometers. We expect the 
coefficient in front of the average price ( d1 ), the one in front of the average geographical 
surface area ( d 2 ), the one in front of the waiting list ( d 3 ), and the one in front of the 
openness index for the telecommunication services to be all positive. 
To estimate the above system of equations, the methods of ordinary least squares 
(OLS), the two stage least squares (2SLS) and the three stage least squares (3SLS) will be 
used. Since the model of interest is a simultaneous equations one, we expect that the 
3SLS method will give us the most robust results. Indeed, it has been proven that the 
3SLS estimator is consistent and in general asymptotically more efficient than the 2SLS 
estimator. Also, the 3SLS accounts for simultaneity since all the equations will be 
estimated together as a set, whereas in the case of OLS and 2SLS the equations in the 
system are estimated separately. Kennedy (1998, pp. 157-167). However, 2SLS and OLS 
will still be employed for the purposes of exploration and comparison2. 
2 SAS version 8 will be used to perform the estimations. 
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To test for misspecification, we will conduct tests for normality, 
heteroscedasticity, and nonlinearity. The Jarque-Bera test3 will be used to test for 
normality of the error distribution. This asymptotic test is based on the skewness and 
kurtosis of the probability distribution. The following test statistic will be used: 
[ S
2 (K -3) 2 ] JB=n-+---
6 24 
where JB is the Jarque-Bera test statistic, n is the number of observations, Sand Kare 
the skewness and kurtosis coefficients of the errors distribution respectively. Under the 
null hypothesis that the error terms are normally distributed, the Jarque-Bera test statistic 
follows a Chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. It is important to note that 
the Jarque-Bera test is a large sample test and our sample of 64 countries might not be 
very large. However it will still give us an idea about whether the residuals are distributed 
normally. To test for heteroscedasticity, Koenker-Bassett test will be used. This test is 
done by regressing the squared residuals on the squared estimated values of the 
regressand. The null hypothesis that the coefficient estimate of the squared estimated 
values of the regressand is zero is tested by an F test. The Ramsey's regression 
specification error test (RESET) will be used to perform a test of nonlinearity (Johnston 
and Dinardo, 1997, p. 121 and Gujarati, 2003, pp. 521-523). In order to perform this test, 
the estimated independent variable is obtained, squared and then introduced as an 
additional regressor in the original regression form. An F test is employed in order to test 
whether the model is mis-specified or well specified. 
To check for identification, the order condition of identifiability was used. The 
model is indeed identified. (For each specification) 
3 For a thorough discussion of the Jarque-Bera test, see Gujarati (2003, pp 148-149 and pp. 886-890). 
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Data 
A cross-country regression model was estimated for a sample of 64 countries 
aggregated as follows: 40 are from low and middle-income countries, and 24 are from 
high-income countries. Appendix 1 contains a list of the countries included in the sample 
categorized by income group. The data covered the period 1989-2000, and averages over 
this period were computed for each variable. Appendix 2 contains a descriptive statistical 
analysis of the variables used in the regressions. Data on GNP growth rate, government 
consumption to GDP ratio, inflation rate, population growth, exports, imports, GDP per 
capita, exchange rates, and geographical surface area were extracted from the World 
Development Indicators (2002) published by the World Bank. Data on the annual 
investment in the telecommunication sector, imports of telecommunication equipment, 
national total revenue of telecommunication sector, number of subscribers in each 
telecommunication service and the waiting list for main lines were taken from the World 
Telecommunication Indicators (2002) published by the International Telecommunication 
Union. Data on the openness index for international trade in telecommunication services 
were taken from Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2001 ). In their paper, Mattoo, 
Rathindran and Subramanian constructed the openness index for the telecommunication 
sector based on the market structure, the foreign ownership structure (whether foreign 
direct investment is allowed), and the existence of independent regulators. For the 
construction of the index, they used market structure data from a survey done by the 
International Telecommunication Union in 1998. The index, which was based on a 
lexicographic approach, ranked countries from 1 to 9, with higher values given to more 
open countries. 
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Estimation Results 
The first estimation of (8 ')-( 11 ') includes all the explanatory variables of interest 
as well as dummy variables to account for differences among the growth rates of low 
income (dil), lower middle income (di2), and upper middle income countries (di3). 
Results for the whole sample from the three methods of estimation are shown in columns 
(1) in Tables 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4. The estimated parameters for the aggregate growth 
production equation indicate that inflation rate and population growth rate are negative 
and significantly associated with GNP growth. On the other hand, the coefficient on the 
openness in trade and the coefficient on the investment in telecommunication 
infrastructure are positive and significant. The coefficient estimate of -0.0245 on the 
dummy variables for low-income countries suggests that low-income countries have 
grown on average less than the high-income countries by 2.45 percentage points. Note 
that the coefficient estimate of the dummy variable for the lower middle-income 
countries is also negative and highly significant. The parameter estimate of the openness 
index in trade of telecommunication services is positive and significantly associated with 
growth in GNP. The total effect of the openness in trade of telecommunication services 
on economic growth for the whole sample can be measured as follows 4: 
aGY: 1 = 0.0187 -0.0023[in(GNJ89)] aop e 
where In( GNJ89) is the mean of In( GNJ89) . 
4 Since the estimation of equations (8 ')-( 11 ') needs a simultaneous econometric methodology, the results of 
the 3SLS methodology are used for the computation of the total effect of the openness in trade of 
telecommunication services. 
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Variable 
Intercept 
ln(Gov) 
ln(lnf) 
Table 4-1 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Growth Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita GNP (1989-2000) 
OLS 2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) 
0.0054 0.0750** -0.0060 0.0738** 0.0059 0.1155*** -0.0065 0.0795** 0.0098 
(0.14) (2.55) (-0.14) (2.25) (0.15) (2.93) (-0.15) (2.52) (0.26) 
-0.0090 -0.0114* -0.0096 -0.0125* -0.0090* -0.0134** -0.0096* -0.0127** -0.0093* 
(-1.59) (-1.97) (-1.52) (-1.92) (-1.74) (-2.37) (-1.65) (-2.11) (-1.80) 
3SLS 
(2) (3) 
0.059** -0.0095 
(2.16) (-0.22) 
-0.0111** -0.0096* 
(-2.11) (-1.68) 
-0.0025** -0.0033*** -0.0019 -0.0028* -0.0025** -0.0031*** -0.0019 -0.0028** -0.0026** -0.0033*** -0.0020* 
(-2.17) (-2.89) (-1.49) (-2.20) (-2.39) (-2.87) (-1.62) (-2.35) (-2.50) (-3.21) (-1.71) 
(4) 
0.0738** 
(2.39) 
-0.0112* 
(-1.93) 
-0.0029** 
(-2.51) 
pop -0.0049** -0.0040* -0.0058** -0.0047* -0.0049** -0.0049** -0.0057** -0.0049** -0.0050** -0.0039* -0.0056** -0.0050** 
(-2.29) (-1.81) (-2.44) (-1.95) (-2.52) (-2.25) (-2.62) (-2.15) (-2.58) (-1.96) (-2.62) (-2.25) 
ln(lnvre,) 0.0025* 0.0010 0.0027* 0.0010 0.0024** -0.0010 0.0027** 0.0007 0.0025** 0.0016 0.0030** 0.0007 
(1.99) (0.87) (1.98) (0.81) (2.02) (-0.58) (2.02) (0.60) (2.09) (1.48) (2.25) (0.55) 
ln(Op) 0.0077** 0.0089** 0.0076*** 0.0088*** 0.0069** 0.0085** 
(2.43) (2.52) (2.61) (2.70) (2.37) (2.62) 
Op Tel 0.0188*** 0.0186*** 0.0129*** 0.0123** 0.0188*** 0.0160*** 0.0129*** 0.0119*** 0.0187*** 0.0191*** 0.0132*** 0.0134*** 
(4.39) (4.16) (2.93) (2.65) (4.79) (3.50) (3.17) (2.76) (4.81) (4.70) (3.25) (3.17) 
Op Te1xln(GNl89) -0.0022*** -0.0022*** -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0022*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0015*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0017*** -0.0016*** 
(-4.49) (-4.22) (-3.08) (-2. 77) (-4.89) (-3.33) (-3.32) (-2.85) (-4.93) (-4.72) (-3.45) 
di1 -0.0241 *** -0.0290*** -0.0152* -0.0201 ** -0.0241 *** -0.0266*** -0.0152* -0.0198** -0.0245*** -0.0249*** -0.0138* 
(-2.89) (-3.43) (-1.71) (-2.23) (-3.18) (-3.26) (-1.86) (-2.36) (-3.26) (-3.27) (-1.71) 
di2 -0.0246*** -0.0281 *** -0.0246*** -0.0264*** -0.0256*** -0.0269*** 
(-3.49) (-3.89) (-3.83) (-3.82) (-4.01) (-4.14) 
di3 -0.0082 -0.0106* -0.0082 -0.0089 -0.0088* -0.0099* 
(-1.40) (-1.77) (-1.54) (-1.53) (-1.66) (-1.83) 
di4 -0.0095 -0.0128* -0.0098* -0.0125** -0.0095 
(-1.52) (-1.92) (-1.65) (-2.02) (-1.61) 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.50 0.45 0.38 0.30 0.50 0.43 0.37 0.30 
Adj. R2 0.41 0.36 0.27 0.20 0.41 0.34 0.27 0.20 
System R2 0.92 0.75 0.77 
Jarque-Bera5 0.89 0.17 0.99 0.61 0.89 0.12 0.98 0.78 0.82 0.18 0.90 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F)° 1.98 0.66 0.38 1.95 1.59 0.26 0.39 1.53 1.36 0.21 0.31 
Reset (F)' 2.33 0.02 0.13 0.83 0.49 0.09 0.17 1.52 0.26 0.23 0.17 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and I% respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
5 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
6 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Bassett statistic is 1.94. 
7 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
48 
(-3.17) 
-0.0154* 
(-1.89) 
-0.0116* 
(-1.93) 
64 
0.61 
0.73 
1.56 
1.04 
Table 4-2 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Demand for Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Number of Subscribers plus the Waiting List 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -9.3357*** 11.5751 *** 5.1932 22.3831***-11.2169*** 9.7845** 3.7644 25.3121***-10.6695*** 15.971*** 11.0263**25.3189*** 
(-9.04) (3.58) (1.37) (6.09) (-8.34) (2.25) (0.75) (4.83) (-7.94) (3.64) (2.29) 
ln(GDP/POP) 1.4055*** 1.2407*** 1.4072*** 1.2398*** 1.3852*** 1.1887*** 
(31.20) (6.74) (30.86) (6.88) (30.56) (7.33) 
ln(P7e1) -0.5169*** -1.2389*** -0.5738 -1.2140** -0.24934 -0.9445 -0.3687 -1.6934* -0.2703 -1.7566*** -0.8137 
(-4.55) (-2.71) (-1.23) (-2.02) (-1.50) (-1.42) (-0.56) (-1.98) (-1.62) (-2.73) (-1.24) 
ln(POP) 0.9134*** 0.8062*** 0.9274*** 0.8168*** 0.9138*** 0.5410*** 
(31.18) (6.73) (30.59) (6.82) (30.27) (4.94) 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.96 0.46 0.46 0.06 0.96 0.43 0.45 0.05 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.44 0.44 0.04 0.96 0.41 0.43 0.04 
System R2 0.92 0.75 0.77 
Jarque-Bera8 5.97 0.64 3.50 0.76 14.13 0.67 3.74 0.98 14.22 0.60 1.57 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F)9 1.98 0.66 0.38 1.95 1.59 0.26 0.39 1.53 1.36 0.21 0.31 
Reset (F)10 1.62 2.34 0.81 1.86 12.68 1.30 1.15 0.74 13.06 1.28 1.63 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
8 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
9 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Bassett statistic is 1.94. 
10 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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(4.83) 
-1.6945* 
(-1.98) 
64 
0.61 
0.99 
1.56 
0.28 
Table 4-3 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Import of Telecommunication Equipment Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Import of Telecom Equipment 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 3.3435* -3.4733 3.3298* -4.0650* 3.1330 -6.8627** 3.2214 -8.4386*** 3.9380 -9.4272*** 3.7887 -5.0800* 
(1.87) (-1.61) (1.88) (-1.91) (1.28) (-2.44) (1.33) (-3.00) (1.62) (-3.48) (1.57) (-1.85) 
ln(GDP) -0.1294 0.7895*** -0.1341 0.7871*** -0.2538 0.8063*** -0.2441 0.8113*** -0.2750* 0.8616*** -0.2759* 0.7060*** 
(-1.00) (13.11) (-1.07) (12.97) (-1.63) (13.32) (-1.61) (12.86) (-1.79) (15.24) (-1.82) (11.62) 
ln(Ex) -0.0042 -0.0497 0.0082 -0.0325 0.0155 -0.0021 
(-0.16) (-1.40) (0.32) (-0.89) (0.62) (-0.06) 
ln(PTel) 0.8050*** 0.3617 0.8132*** 0.4370* 1.0324*** 0.8356** 1.0064*** 1.0521 ••• 1.0152*** 1.0160*** 0.9954*** 0.9183*** 
(4.61) (1.58) (4.91) (1.95) (4.34) (2.44) (4.52) (3.10) (4.29) (3.02) (4.47) (2.73) 
Op Tel 0.0546* 0.1256*** 0.0548* 0.1332*** 0.0456 0.1288*** 0.0451 0.1339*** 0.0679** 0.1241*** 0.0522* 0.1543*** 
(1.84) (3.20) (1.86) (3.40) (1.53) (3.30) (1.52) (3.33) (2.34) (3.44) (1.76) 
trt:isub; +itt') 0.9366*** 0.9412*** 1.0693*** 1.0595*** 1.0480*** 1.0769*** ;~1 
(7.52) (7.83) (7.10) (7.22) (7.07) (7.35) 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.84 0.92 0.84 0.92 0.83 
Adj. R2 0.91 0.84 0.92 0.83 0.91 0.83 0.91 0.82 
System R2 0.92 0.75 0.77 
Jarque-Bera 11 19.60 20.75 19.27 18.28 4.38 1.92 4.81 1.48 3.29 1.38 4.13 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F) 12 1.98 0.66 0.38 1.95 1.59 0.26 0.39 1.53 1.36 0.21 0.31 
Reset (F)13 2.43 0.96 2.48 0.67 3.40 1.08 6.13 1.49 3.34 0.97 6.10 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
11 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
12 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Bassett statistic is 1.94. 
13 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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(3.88) 
64 
0.61 
2.33 
1.56 
1.37 
Table 4-4 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Supply of Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Investment in Telecom Infrastructure plus Imports 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 17.1854*** 23.0032*** 20.4494*** 18.6622*** 20.4491*** 35.4027*** 24.3394*** 19.5800*** 21.5653*** 38.5334*** 23.0017*** 23.1633**' 
(5.15) (6.22) (5.99) (6.59) (4.09) (5.71) (4.61) (4.90) (4.34) (6.50) (4.56) 
ln{PTel) 
-0.2579 -0.8384 -0.3227 -0.1317 -0.7367 -2.6228*** -0.9004 -0.2797 -0.9034 -2.6858*** -0.6588 
(-0.56) (-1.59) (-0.65) (-0.29) (-1.03) (-2.89) (-1.16) (-0.44) (-1.27) (-3.04) (-0.88) 
ln(GA) 0.2671*** 0.3332*** 0.2633*** 0.32057*** 0.2843*** 0.0669 
{3.21) {3.43) {3.26) (3.03) (3.56) (0.82) 
ln(WL) -0.0639 -0.1670*** -0.0463 -0.0832* -0.3095*** -0.0699 -0.1045** -0.2732*** -0.0182 
(-1.38) (-3.42) (-0.94) (-1.66) (-4.36) (-1.29) (-2.12) (-4.25) (-0.37) 
Op Tel 0.3515*** 0.3877*** 0.4184*** 0.3330*** 0.3647*** 0.4161*** 0.3075*** 0.2600*** 
(4.98) (5.18) (6.22) (4.64) (4.73) (6.29) {4.33) (3.69) 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R2 0.49 0.28 0.40 0.39 0.49 0.31 0.40 0.39 
Adj. R2 0.46 0.24 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.28 0.37 0.37 
System R2 0.92 0.75 0.77 
Jarque-Bera 14 0.70 0.33 1.28 0.81 0.62 0.08 1.36 0.77 0.51 0.57 0.58 
Joint Koenker-
Bassett {F) 15 1.98 0.66 0.38 1.95 1.59 0.26 0.39 1.53 1.36 0.21 0.31 
Reset (F)16 0.39 0.38 1.28 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.00 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
14 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
15 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Bassett statistic is 1.94. 
16 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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(5.91) 
-0.6260 
(-0.98) 
0.1709*** 
(4.23) 
64 
0.61 
0.54 
1.56 
0.37 
The total effect is equal to -0.001023 (with a standard error of 0.000608) indicating that 
an increase of one unit in the index will lead to a decrease of 0.1023 percentage points in 
GNP per capita growth rate. This result does not match previous expectations. The 
insight behind the implementation of the interaction parameter was that low-income 
countries rarely produce telecommunication services, they mainly import those services. 
Hence this interaction parameter captures the fact that openness in trade of 
telecommunication services might benefit only less developed countries; developed 
countries might be hurt from openness. Setting the above equation equal to zero and 
solving for GN/89 give us a threshold of $3,396 suggesting that countries that have an 
initial income (GNP per capita in 1989 adjusted for PPP) above $3,396 are hurt from 
openness in trade of telecommunication services. In order to investigate the reason 
behind the negative sign of the total effect of the openness index in trade in 
telecommunication services, we split our sample and estimated the same models for low 
and middle-income countries alone, and high-income countries alone. The results are 
reported in Tables 4-5, 4-6, 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10, 4-11, and 4-12. The total effect of the 
openness in trade of telecommunication services on economic growth for low and 
middle-income countries is 0.000727 (with a standard error of 0.000817) meaning that an 
increase of the telecommunication openness index by one point will lead to an increase in 
GNP per capita growth by 0.0727 percentage points. On the other hand, the total effect of 
the openness in trade of telecommunication services on economic growth for high-
income countries is -0.00105 (with a standard error of 0.000699), suggesting that an 
increase in the telecommunication openness index by one point will lead to a decrease of 
the GNP growth rate by 0.105 percentage point. This analysis explains the negative sign 
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for the total effect of openness in telecommunication sector when the whole sample was 
considered in the estimation. Note that the total effect for high-income countries is larger 
in absolute value than the total effect for the low-income countries. The negative effect in 
the whole sample is caused by the negative effect found in the high-income countries 
sample. This result can be explained through the theory of reciprocal demand of John 
Stuart Mill (1921). Assume that low-income countries import telecommunication services 
and export another good, say agricultural products. Most low-income countries have a 
small demand for telecommunication services compared to the demand of agricultural 
products of high-income countries. Considering low income countries as small ones, the 
term of trade would converge to the price of the high-income countries and hence low-
income countries would benefit more than high-income countries from trade. In the 
extreme case, high-income countries might even be hurt from trading. On the other hand, 
as we have seen in chapter one, there might be negative effects when liberalizing 
international trade in telecommunication services. According to Mattoo Rathindran and 
Subramanian(2001) those negative effects are explained through the decrease in the 
employment of national factors of production, and since GNP accounts for income earned 
by the citizens and businesses of the nation, the negative effect of the decrease in 
employment of national factors can have a big impact on the GNP per capita growth. In 
the extreme case, the magnitude of the negative factor employment effect might be higher 
than the magnitude of the spillover of technology and the total result of liberalizing trade 
in telecommunication services can be negative. In the case of lower- income counties, the 
magnitude of the positive spillover of technology effect seems to be much higher than 
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Table 4-5 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Growth Equation Regression Results: Low And Middle Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita GNP (1989-2000) 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.0185 0.0649 0.0030 0.0489 0.0117 0.1069** -0.0040 0.0638 0.0129 0.1042** -0.0076 0.0562 
(0.31) (1.47) (0.05) (1.07) (0.22) (2.18) (-0.07) (1.51) (0.24) (2.13) (-0.14) (1.40) 
ln(Gov) -0.0147 -0.0143 -0.0147 -0.0143 -0.0146 -0.0160* -0.0146* -0.0149* -0.0157* -0.0159* -0.0147* -0.0143* 
(-1.57) (-1.52) (-1.57) (-1.52) (-1.79) (-1.87) (-1.79) (-1.79) (-1.95) (-1.86) (-1.83) (-1.81) 
ln(lnf) -0.0028* -0.0037** -0.0028* -0.0037** -0.0028** -0.0035*** -0.0028** -0.0036*** -0.0027* -0.0034** -0.0026* -0.0031** 
(-1.80) (-2.65) (-1.80) (-2.65) (-2.06) (-2.75) (-2.06) (-2.93) (-2.01) (-2.74) (-1.94) (-2.63) 
pop -0.0076** -0.0076** -0.0076** -0.0076** 0.0067 -0.0088*** -0.0074** -0.0080** -0.0073** -0.0087*** -0.0072** -0.0077*** 
(-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.31) (1.40) (-2.86) (-2.63) (-2.74) (-2.57) (-2.83) (-2.55) (-2.75) 
ln(lnvTel) 0.0028 0.0018 0.0028 0.0018 0.0031* -0.0002 0.0031* 0.0011 0.0032* -0.0001 0.0032* 0.0013 
(1.49) (1.06) (1.49) (1.06) (1.75) (-0.09) (1.75) (0.69) (1.82) (-0.03) (1.84) (0.81) 
ln(Op) 0.0064 0.0064 0.0067 0.0067 0.0066 0.0066 
(1.17) (1.17) (1.40) (1.40) (1.39) (1.40) 
Op Tel 0.0218*** 0.0211 *** 0.0218*** 0.0211 *** 0.0222*** 0.0183** 0.0222*** 0.0201 *** 0.0221*** 0.0184** 0.0218*** 0.0223*** 
(2.99) (2.88) (2.99) (2.88) (3.47) (2.66) (3.47) (3.08) (3.49) (2.68) (3.44) (3.59) 
Op Te1xln(GNl89) -0.0027*** -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0026*** -0.0027*** -0.0022** -0.0027*** -0.0024*** -0.0027*** -0.0022** -0.0027*** -0.0027*** 
(-2.95) (-2.82) (-2.95) (-2.82) (-3.42) (-2.51) (-3.42) (-2.99) (-3.45) (-2.54) (-3.39) (-3.49) 
di1 -0.0157* -0.0161* -0.0157** -0.0149** -0.0162** -0.0149** 
(-1.97) (-2.01) (-2.28) (-2.07) (-2.37) (-2.06) 
di2 -0.0169*** -0.0170*** -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0169*** -0.0169*** -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0179*** -0.0169*** -0.0008 -0.0008 
(-3.00) (-3.00) (-0.20) (-0.15) (-3.46) (-3.30) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-3.70) (-3.31) (-0.15) (-0.16) 
di3 0.0156* 0.0161* 0.157** 0.0157** 0.0170** 0.0186*** 
(1.97) (2.01) (2.28) (2.22) (2.49) 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.51 
Adj. R2 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.38 
System R2 0.90 0.65 0.80 
Jarque-Bera 17 1.05 0.55 1.05 0.55 1.06 0.39 1.06 0.40 1.08 0.38 1.26 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F) 18 1.23 1.92 1.46 1.93 1.41 3.50 1.91 2.19 1.41 3.25 0.76 
Reset (F)19 0.06 0.95 0.06 0.95 7.01 8.34 7.01 8.07 0.09 1.21 0.13 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
17 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
18 The 5% critical value for Koenker-Bassett statistic is 2.43. 
19 The 5% critical values for the F statistic are 3.07 for models (1 ), (2) and (3), and 3.06 for models (4). 
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(2.77) 
40 
0.61 
0.29 
2.78 
0.98 
Table 4-6 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Demand for Telecom Services Equation Regression Results : Low And Middle Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Number of Subscribers plus the Waiting List 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -6.8840*** 17.2536*** 12.2286*** 29.0054*** -10.0803*** 22.2785*** 17.1530*** 38.3092*** -8.8521*** 27.0647*** 27.5370*** 38.1524*** 
(-3.39) (4.02) (3.47) (9.79) (-3.61) (3.53) (3.83) (8.41) (-3.19) (4.88) (7.59) (8.39) 
ln(GDP/POP) 1.3425*** 0.9951*** 1.4198*** 0.8489** 1.3657*** 0.5492** 
(13.49) (3.44) (12.98) (2.69) (12.73) (2.17) 
ln(PTel) 
-0.6697*** -1.8438*** -1.6283*** -2.4378*** -0.3494 -2.4775*** -2.2510*** -3.9793*** -0.4344* -2.8630*** -2.9436*** -3.9534*** 
(-3.91) (-3.97) (-4.31) (-4.98) (-1.36) (-3.31) (-4.36) (-5.28) (-1.69) (-4.05) (-6.09) 
ln(POP) 0.8521*** 0.7135*** 0.8899*** 0.6436*** 0.8736*** 0.2713*** 
(17.01) (6.00) (16.25) (5.15) (16.00) (3.24) 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.94 0.54 0.69 0.39 0.94 0.49 0.67 0.41 
Adj. R2 0.94 0.51 0.67 0.37 0.93 0.47 0.66 0.39 
System R2 0.90 0.65 0.80 
Jarque-Bera20 0.28 0.35 0.90 0.29 0.94 0.56 0.70 0.47 1.06 0.44 0.86 
Joint 
Koenker-
Bassett (F)2' 1.23 1.92 1.46 1.93 1.41 3.50 1.91 2.19 1.41 3.25 0.76 
Reset (F)22 0.84 3.63 3.15 0.38 0.97 5.20 2.67 0.36 0.91 4.89 2.53 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
20 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
21 The 5% critical value for Koenker-Bassett statistic is 2.43. 
22 The 5% critical values for the F statistic are 3.07 for models (1 ), (2) and (3), and 3.06 for models ( 4). 
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(-5.26) 
40 
0.61 
0.47 
2.78 
0.42 
Table 4-7 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Import of Telecom Equipment Equation Regression Results: Low And Middle Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Import of Telecom Equipment 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.0764 -06012 2.2756 -0.728 0.7824 0.9239 1.6111 -0.6794 0.4283 4.8402 0.2687 4.5774 
(0.93 (-0.20) (1.04) (-0.25) (0.25) (0.23) (0.54) (-0.16) (0.14) (1.25) (0.09) (1.11) 
ln(GDP) -0.0029 0. 7611 *** 0.0084 0.7618*** -0.1940 0.7469*** -0.1722 0.7612'** -0.3242' 0.6614**' -0.2258 0.6482'** 
(-0.02) (9.99) (0.06) (10.14) (-1.10) (10.04) (-0.99) (9.10) (-1.87) (9.38) (-1.31) (8.33) 
ln(Ex) 0.0175 -0.0089 0.0318 -0.0148 0.0395 0.0003 
(0.59) (-0.22) (1.07) (-0.37) (1.40) (0.01) 
ln(PTel) 0.7128*** -0.0028 0.6773*** 0.0097 1.390*** -0.1860 1.0134*** 0.0043 1.3388*'* -0.4774 1.2103*** -0.3989 
(3.04) (-0.01) (3.02) (0.04) (3.44) (-0.41) (3.30) (0.01) (4.11) (-1.10) (3.98) 
Op Tel 0.0476 0.0646 0.0460 0.0655 0.0517 0.0556 0.0470 0.0653 0.0532* 0.0391 0.0464 
(1.46) (1.45) (1.43) (1.49) (1.55) (1.20) (1.44) (1.48) (1.67) (0.96) (1.44) 
h(_i:sub; +lll) 0.8395*** 0.8258*** 1.0778*** 1.0444*** 1.2423*** 1.1486*** 
i=l 
(5.66) (5.69) (5.96) (5.91) (7.04) 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.91 0.82 0.91 0.82 0.90 0.82 0.90 0.82 
Adj. R2 0.89 0.80 0.90 0.80 0.88 0.80 0.89 0.80 
System R2 0.90 0.65 
Jarque-Bera23 28.24 54.26 33.39 52.33 2.44 92.92 3.44 53.17 2.27 73.62 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F)24 1.23 1.92 1.46 1.93 1.41 3.50 1.91 2.19 1.41 3.25 
Reset (F)'5 0.82 4.89 1.04 4.50 0.15 2.56 1.79 4.52 0.12 3.71 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
23 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
24 The 5% critical value for Koenker-Bassett statistic is 2.43. 
25 The 5% critical values for the F statistic are 3.07 for models (1 ), (2) and (3), and 3.06 for models (4). 
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(6.60) 
40 
0.80 
2.27 
0.76 
1.57 
(-0.92) 
0.0626 
(1.46) 
40 
0.61 
55.75 
2.78 
8.54 
Table 4-8 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Supply of Telecom Services Equation Regression Results: Low And Middle Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Investment in Telecom Infrastructure plus Imports 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 18.2124*** 20.6716*** 20.2502*** 26.1419*** 25.2636*** 30.2461*** 25.8745*** 35.9923*** 25.2951*** 34.1970*** 30.9484*** 37.1091**' 
(5.72) (6.47) (5.37) (8.41) (5.58) (4.93) (4.92) (6.99) (5.63) (6.58) (7.31) (8.92) 
ln(PTeJ) 
-0.9947** -1.3163*** -0.8231* -1.2292** -1.9842*** -2.5829*** -1.5901** -2.7745*** -1.9889*** -2.7070*** -2.1396*** -2.9263*** 
(-2.47) (-3.27) (-1.71) (-2.55) (-3.28) (-3.44) (-2.29) (-3.45) (-3.31) (-3.94) (-3.52) 
ln(GA) 0.4679*** 0.4874*** 0.4968*** 0.5836*** 0.4955*** 0.2188 
(4.11) (4.04) (4.28) (309) (4.30) (1.52) 
ln(WL) 0.0662 0.0698 0.2957** -0.0319 -0.1960 0.2299* -0.0280 -0.0783 0.1135 
(0.58) (0.57) (2.46) (-0.26) (-0.63) (1.83) (-0.23) (-0.33) (1.35) 
0.1592** 0.1793** 0.1904** 0.1033 0.1365 0.0870 0.09658 0.0614 
(2.36) (2.22) (2.22) (1.42) (1.62) (0.85) (1.34) (1.19) 
N 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
R2 0.62 0.55 0.43 0.33 0.60 0.50 0.43 0.35 
Adj. R2 0.57 0.51 0.38 0.29 0.55 0.46 0.38 0.32 
System R2 0.90 0.65 0.80 
Jarque-Bera26 0.93 4.82 7.26 0.76 0.79 0.30 2.36 1.28 0.73 0.33 1.76 
Joint Koenker-
Bassett (F}27 1.23 1.92 1.46 1.93 1.41 3.50 1.91 2.19 1.41 3.25 0.76 
Reset (F)28 0.29 0.77 0.01 0.35 0.17 0.41 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.75 0.03 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
26 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
27 The 5% critical values for Koenker-Bassett statistic is 2.43. 
28The 5% critical values for the F statistic are 3.07 for models (1), (2) and (3), and 3.06 for models (4). 
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(-4.26) 
0.04739*** 
(2.77) 
40 
0.61 
1.26 
2.78 
0.27 
Table 4-9 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Growth Equation Regression Results: High Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita GNP (1989-2000) 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (1) (1) 
Intercept -0.0003 -0.0093 -0.0057 
(-0.01) (-0.30) (-0.19) 
ln(Gov) -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0002 
(-0.16) (-0.08) (-0.05) 
ln(lnf) -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0023 
(-1.17) (-1.38) (-1.29) 
pop 0.0011 0.0009 0.0013 
(0.53) (0.58) (0.77) 
ln(lnvTeJ) 0.0011 0.0014 0.0012 
(0.96) (1.47) (1.22) 
ln(Op) 0.0064** 0.0069*** 0.0067** 
(2.30) (2.99) (2.90) 
Op Tel 0.0184* 0.0182** 0.0183** 
(2.05) (2.47) (2.51) 
OpTelxln(GNl89) 
-0.0021** -0.0021 ** -0.0020** 
(-2.30) (-2.80) (-2.80) 
N 24 24 24 
R2 0.69 0.70 
Adj. R2 0.56 0.56 
System R2 0.98 
Jarque-Bera29 2.96 3.56 2.49 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F)30 1.02 1.50 1.22 
Reset (F)31 7.93 7.65 8.22 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
29 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
30 The 5% critical value for the Koenker Bassett statistic is 2.49. 
31 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.14. 
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Table 4-10 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Demand for Telecom Services Equation Regression Results: High Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Number of Subscribers plus the Waiting List 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable { 1} {1} {1} 
Intercept -8. 7694*** -8.7091*** -8.6275*** 
(-5.65) (-6.11) (-6.24) 
ln(GDP/POP) 1.0735*** 1.0950*** 1.0679*** 
(5.92) (6.39) (6.57) 
ln(PTel) 
-0.2321 -0.2789 -0.2405 
(-1.38) (-1.54) (-1.34) 
ln(POP) 0.9723*** 0.9735*** 0.9702*** 
(47.18) (51.23) (51.33) 
N 24 24 
R2 0.99 0.99 
Adj. R2 0.99 0.99 
System R2 0.98 
Jarque-Bera32 0.33 0.20 0.23 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F)33 1.02 1.50 1.22 
Reset (F)34 4.73 2.75 2.82 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
32 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
33 The 5% critical value for the Koenker Bassett statistic is 2.49. 
34 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.14. 
59 
Table 4-11 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Import of Telecom Equipment Equation Regression Results: High Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Import of Telecom Equipment 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (1) (1) 
Intercept 7.4175 16.2238 23.0714** 
(1.02) (1.34) (2.09) 
ln(GDP) -0.9776 -2.3646 -3.1285** 
(-1.17) (-1.50) (-2.20) 
ln(Ex) -0.0236 0.0039 0.0033 
(-0.43) (0.07) (0.06) 
ln(PTel) 1.7018** 2.4257*** 2.6689*** 
(2.77) (2.97) (3.42) 
Op Tel 0.0369 -0.0189 0.03245 
(0.48) (-0.21) (0.40) 
5 1. 7211* 3.1596* 3.8517** ln(L sub; + wl) 
i=l (1.98) (1.92) (2.59) 
N 24 24 24 
R2 0.90 0.89 
Adj. R2 0.88 0.86 
System R2 0.98 
Jarq ue-Bera35 2.85 0.02 0.76 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F)36 1.02 1.50 1.22 
Reset (F)37 1.70 1.80 1.89 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
35 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
36 The 5% critical value for the Koenker Bassett statistic is 2.49. 
37 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.14. 
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Table 4-12 
Openness in Telecommunications Services and Growth 
Supply of Telecom Services Equation Regression Results: High Income Countries 
Dependent Variable: Investment in Telecom Infrastructure plus Imports 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable {1} {1} (1) 
Intercept -3.8229 -7.4950 -7.3926 
(-0.53) (-1.01) (-1.01) 
ln(PTel) 3.0742** 3.6638*** 3.6530*** 
(2. 71) (3.13) (3.14) 
ln(GA) 0.2749** 0.2866** 0.3192*** 
(2.46) (2.84) (3.27) 
ln(WL) 0.0894 0.0966* 0.0791 
(1.55) (1.85) (1.59) 
Op Tel 0.3330** 0.3097** 0.2679** 
(2.49) (2.53) (2.22) 
N 24 24 24 
R2 0.66 0.66 
Adj. R2 0.59 0.59 
System R2 0.98 
Jarq ue-Bera38 3.16 5.23 6.27 
Joint Koenker-Bassett (F )39 1.02 1.50 1.22 
Reset (F}4° 0.52 0.60 0.30 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
38 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
39 The 5% critical value for the Koenker Bassett statistic is 2.49. 
40 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.14. 
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the magnitude of the negative effect of the decrease in the employment of national 
factors, and hence the total effect of liberalizing trade in telecommunication services is 
positive. It is important to note that the above explanations are hypothesis and not 
conclusions. 
Models (2), (3), and (4) were estimated to look at the effect of removing an 
independent variable from the regression on the significance of the coefficient estimates 
of other explanatory variables. It seems that there are no noticeable changes with regard 
to the significance level of the parameter estimates when we exclude the openness in 
trade variable or when we include a dummy variable accounting for lower middle-income 
and upper middle-income countries together instead of including two separate dummies 
accounting for both categories of countries independently. 
Before interpreting other equations in our models, it is worth emphasizing that the 
purpose of incorporating the demand, import, and supply of telecommunication services 
equations in the model is to control for them as much as possible. In addition, it is 
reassuring that most of the estimates in all equations do conform to economic theory and 
other related empirical evidence. 
Results of the estimation of the demand for telecommunication services equation 
for the whole sample, low and middle-income and high income-countries are reported in 
Tables 4-2, 4-6, and 4-10 respectively. The parameter estimate of the GDP per capita 
appears to be positive and significantly associated with the quantity demanded for all 
samples, in all models, and all estimation methodologies. This result suggests that the 
income elasticity is positive and that telecommunication services are normal services as 
opposed to inferior services. The estimate of the elasticity for the whole sample is 
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roughly 1.39 suggesting that if per capita income increases (decreases) by one percent, 
demand for telecommunication services increases (decreases) by 1.39 percent. Estimates 
of the price coefficient are not significant for the 3SLS estimation (model 1) for the 
whole sample case. However estimates of the price coefficient for the low and middle-
income countries are negative and in most cases larger than one and highly significant 
(models 2,3, and 4) suggesting that the demand for telecommunication services in low 
and middle-income countries is indeed price elastic. Model (2) of the 3SLS estimation for 
the low and middle-income countries reveal that a one percent increase in the average 
price of telecommunication services leads to a 2.86 percent decrease in the number of 
telecommunication services subscribers. On the other hand, estimates of the price 
coefficient for high-income countries are all negative and insignificant suggesting that the 
demand for telecommunication services in high-income countries is inelastic. Those 
results do match the reality. Indeed, telecommunication services are becoming necessary 
services in high income-countries. Most households and businesses in developed 
countries are connected to the internet and to any form of telephone services and 
telecommunication services are becoming a part of a regular monthly consumption of 
most households and businesses in high-income countries. The coefficient on the total 
population is positive and highly significant in models (1) and (3) across all samples. To 
the extent that population and GDP are proportionally related, an increase in the total 
population will generate significant increase in the number of telecommunication services 
subscribers. 
For the import of telecommunication equipment equation, we find that income is 
fairly significant across different specifications and different methodologies and sample 
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estimation. However, the mcome elasticity of the demand for import of 
telecommunication equipments is inelastic and positive (models 2 and 4) for low-income 
countries and negative and elastic for high-income countries. The results for low and 
middle-income countries reveal the fact that if income changes by a certain percentage 
citeris paribus, the percentage change in demand for import of telecommunication 
equipment will be less than that of income per capita. This is fairly conformable with the 
reality in low and middle-income countries. In the case of high-income countries, the 
estimation results of the 3SLS suggest that an increase of income by one percent leads to 
a decrease of the demand for imports of telecommunication equipment by 3 .13 percent. 
This result is surprising since we expect that an increase in income will lead to an 
increase in imports of telecommunication equipment. However, in the case of high-
income countries, an increase in income may lead to more investment in research for 
technology, leading to a decrease in the national price of telecommunication equipment, 
and hence to a decrease in the import of telecommunication equipment. Estimates of the 
price coefficient reveal that the price elasticity for the demand of import of 
telecommunication equipment is positive, elastic and highly significant41 • The exchange 
rate doesn't seem to be a determinant of import of telecommunication equipment. One 
possible explanation of this result is that exchange rates being rather very different across 
countries and even within certain income level groups. Coefficient estimates on the 
openness in trade of telecommunication services index are positive and fairly significant 
for the whole sample but only significant at the 10 percent level for low and middle-
income countries. In the case of high-income countries this coefficient is positive but not 
41 We obtained negative coefficient estimates for specifications (2) and (4) for low and middle-income 
countries. This result can be due because of the exclusion of the number of subscribers and waiting list 
from those two specifications. 
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significant. One possible explanation of this is that telecommunication equipment falls in 
the category of goods and not services. However, one can argue that in order to supply 
the service, a country needs to have that equipment; therefore we considered the import 
of telecommunication equipment as a part of the supply of telecommunication services. 
In general this result is still reasonable since the sign of the coefficient matches our 
expectations. The demand of telecommunication services seems to be highly associated 
with the import of telecommunication equipment suggesting that import of 
telecommunication equipment increases when the number of subscribers and the number 
of people waiting for connection to the public network increases. This result is not 
surprising since suppliers of telecommunication services need to have an incentive to 
import telecommunication equipment and this incentive is reflected by the amount of 
current subscribers as well as the potential ones. 
Results for the supply of telecommunication services equation reveal that the price 
of telecommunication services is inversely related to the quantity supplied in the case of 
low and middle-income countries. This unanticipated result suggests that as prices 
become larger, supply shrinks. One possible explanation of this, as Roller and Waverman 
(2001) suggest, is that the market structure in low and middle-income countries is very 
different across each state. As we see below, this result will change when we run the 
model for only high-income countries. In this latter case, the supply elasticity for 
telecommunication services is 3.65 indicating that an increase (decrease) of one percent 
in the price leads to an increase (decrease) of 3.65 percent in quantity supplied. We also 
find that the geographic area is positively related to supply in all sample estimation. The 
waiting list for mainlines per capita is inversely related to supply in the case of the whole 
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sample suggesting that countries with a large waiting list invest less m 
telecommunication infrastructure and import less telecommunication equipment. 
However this result will not survive once we split the sample. In both the high-income 
and the low and middle-income cases, the coefficient estimate of the waiting list is not 
statistically significant suggesting that supply does not react in response to excess 
demand, possibly because of technical or capacity constraint. As expected, openness in 
trade in telecommunication services is positively related to supply. However, in some 
cases it is not highly significant. 
The Effect of Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services on Growth 
Methodology 
The empirical implementation of the augmented model integrating both 
telecommunication and financial services sectors requires the estimation of the following 
system of equations: 
GNP growth equation: 
Demand for telecommunication services equation: 
5 
(9') ln(ISub;j + WLj) = b0 + b1 ln(GDPj I POP) +b2 lnPt1 + b3 lnPOPj + sJ 
i=I 
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Import of telecommunication equipment equation: 
lnM?1 = C0 +c1 lnGDPj +c2 lnPJe1 +c3 lnExj +c40pJe1 
(1 O') s 
+ c5 ln(ISubii + WL) + &~ 
i=l 
Supply of telecommunication services equation: 
Demand for financial services equation: 
Supply of financial services equation: 
where BA j I GDPj is the total bank assets to GDP ratio of country j. This variable is a 
proxy measure for the size of the demand for banking operations in the country of 
interest. Opt is the openness index of trade in financial services for country j; this index 
takes values from 1 to 8 with higher values indicating more openness. In order to account 
for the effect between the interaction of the openness in telecommunication services and 
the openness of financial services on economic growth, we included an interaction 
parameter representing the product of the initial GNP ( y j ) by the openness index of 
telecommunication services ( Op?1 ) and the openness of financial services ( Oprn ). It is 
worth noting that this interaction variable accounts also for the convergence rate. As 
previously mentioned, we expect that the coefficient on the government consumption to 
GDP ratio ( a1 ), the inflation rate ( a2 ), the population growth rate ( a3 ), and the 
interaction variable ( a 9 ) to be negative. Coefficient estimates in front of investment in 
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telecommunication infrastructure and the total bank asset to GDP ratio are expected to be 
positive. Equations (9'), (10'), and (11 ') reflect the demand and supply in the 
telecommunication services sector and are specified in the same manner as in the 
previous model. Equation (13') states that the demand for banking operations measured 
by the average total bank assets to GDP ratio (ln(BAj I GDP)) is a function of the 
average real interest rate42 ( r;), the average inflation rate (Inf), the average GDP per 
capita ( GDPj I POPj) and the average total population ( POPj ). We expect the coefficient 
estimates in front of the average real interest rate ( e1 ), the average GDP per capita ( e3 ), 
and the average total population ( e4 ) to be positive. The parameter estimate in front of 
the average inflation rate ( e2 ) is expected to be negative. Equation (14') estimates the 
supply of banking services. The dependant variable B j represents the number of banks 
per 100,000 people in country j. A better measure of the supply of banking services 
would be the number of bank branches in each country. One can argue that with the new 
technology, at least in developed countries, the number of bank branches is no longer 
relevant because of online banking. On the other hand, because of the strict regulation of 
the banking sector in many countries, many banks are merging; hence the number of 
banks will decline while the number of branches remains the same. For the purpose of 
this study and because of the lack of data, the number of banks will be used instead of the 
number of bank branches. Explanatory variables for the number of banks include the 
average geographical area ( GA j ), the average real interest rate ( rj) and an interaction 
variable to account for the effect of development and openness in financial services 
42 The real interest rate is defined as the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator. 
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sector on the supply of banking services. We expect that the coefficient estimate in front 
of the average geographical area ( p 1 ), the interaction variable ( p 2 ), and the average real 
interest rate ( p 3 ) to be all positive. 
We used the same misspecification testing approach as we did for the previous model. 
The Jarque-Bera, Koenker Bassett's, and Reset tests will be used to test for normality, 
heteroscedasticity and linearity respectively. To check for identification, the order 
condition of identifiability was used. The model is indeed identified. (For each 
specification) 
The same sample is used to run the cross-country regression43 . Data on the real 
interest rate were extracted from the World Development Indicators (2002) published by 
the World Bank. Data on the bank assets to GDP ratio and on the number of banks were 
taken from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001). These data are based on a survey funded by 
the World Bank to collect information on the structure and regulation of commercial 
banks around the world. Responses to the surveys were received between 1998 and 2000. 
Data on the openness in financial services sector were taken from Mattoo, Rathindran and 
Subramanian (2001). In their paper, Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian constructed the 
openness index for the financial services sector based on the market structure, the foreign 
equity, and Dailami's (2000) capital control index 44 . They used inferred data based on 
43 Refer to Appendix 1 for a comprehensive list of countries used for this regression. 
44 Dailarni's index takes into consideration the coding of rules, regulations and administrative procedures 
that can affect the flow of capital. For more detail about how Dailarni constructed this index, refer to 
Dailarni (2000). 
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each country's commitment to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The 
index ranks from 1 to 8 with higher ranking indicating more financial openness. 
Estimation Results 
Results from the regressions are shown in Tables 4-13, 4-14, 4-15, 4-16, 4-17, and 
4-18. The estimated parameters45 for the aggregate growth production function indicate 
that population growth rate is negatively and significantly related to GNP growth at the 1 
5 percent level. Inflation rate and government consumption to GDP ratio are also 
negatively related to GNP growth but the coefficient estimates are not significant. On the 
other hand, investment in telecommunication infrastructure is inversely related to growth. 
This is surprising as it suggests that growth is higher with less investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure. This result occurred when we included the financial 
sector in the regression. However, it is worth noting that the coefficient estimate is not 
statistically significant. The parameter estimate in front of the bank assets to GDP ratio is 
positive and significant at the 10 percent level suggesting that an increase in the bank 
assets to GDP ratio by one point will lead to an increase in GNP growth by 0.75 
percentage point. This result is satisfying since it has been shown in the literature that 
financial operations are an important for a healthy growing economy. Coefficient 
estimates in front of the openness index of trade in telecommunication services as well as 
the index of openness in trade in financial services are positive and significantly 
associated with growth. 
45 Only 3SLS estimation results will be discussed. 
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Table 4-13 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth 
Growth Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita GNP {1989-2000) 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.0533 0.0567 0.0276 0.0514* 0.0583 0.0441 -0.0144 0.0514** 0.0290 0.0196 -0.0830 0.0368 
(0.98) (1.45) (0.48) (1.90) (0.86) (1.13) (-0.21) (2.11) (0.44) (0.53) (-1.34) (1.58) 
ln(Gov) -0.0109 -0.0108 -0.0063 -0.0076 -0.0115 -0.0122* -0.0121 -0.0076 -0.0100 -0.0111 -0.0093 -0.0056 
(-1.33) (-1.35) (-1.09) (-1.00) (-1.65) (-1.75) (-1.52) (-1.11) (-1.49) (-1.69) (-1.30) (-0.86) 
ln(lnf) -0.0026 -0.0026* -0.0022 -0.0036** -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0036*** -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0027** 
(-1.42) (-1.67) (-1.11) (-2.55) (-1.30) (-1.27) (-0.65) (-2.83) (-0.52) (-0.26) (0.12) (-2.25) 
pop -0.0059* -0.0059* -0.0060* -0.0067** -0.0056* -0.0052* -0.0042 -0.0067** -0.0059** -0.0053* -0.0037 -0.0065** 
(-1.87) (-1.91) (-1.77) (-2.32) (-1.91) (-1.86) (-1.28) (-2.58) (-2.11) (-2.02) (-1.26) (-2.59) 
ln(lnvT•') -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0008 0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0005 0.0025 
(-0.45) (-0.62) (0.01) (-0.53) (-0.55) (0.49) (-0.41) (-0.39) (1.25) 
ln(bankass/GDP) 0.0041 0.0041 0.0035 0.0066* 0.0072** 0.0085* 0.0075* 0.0089*** 0.0118*** 
(1.32) (1.42) (1.06) (1.71) (2.17) (1.95) (2.00) (2.85) (3.01) 
ln(Op) 0.0005 0.0021 -0.0011 0.0025 0.0006 0.0035 
(0.09) (0.38) (-0.21) (0.42) (0.11) (0.66) 
Op Tel 0.0061** 0.0061*** 0.0054** 0.0057** 0.0062*** 0.0061 *** 0.0053** 0.0057*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0057** 0.0066*** 
(2.62) (2.79) (2.19) (2.53) (3.08) (3.23) (2.36) (2.82) (3.35) (3.64) (2.78) (3.42) 
Op Fin 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0030* 0.0025 0.0026* 0.0029* 0.0030* 0.0031** 0.0030** 0.0039** 0.0035** 
(1.57) (1.59) (1.49) (1.75) (1.67) (1.74) (1.70) (1.94) (2.12) (2.14) (2.55) (2.37) 
Op Tel X OpFin X ln(GNl89) -0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** -0.0001*** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ** -0.0001*** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** 
(-2.71) (-2.87) (-2.25) (-2.77) (-3.24) (-3.31) (-2.65) (-3.08) (-3.45) (-3.53) (-3.25) 
di1 -0.0048 -0.0049 -0.0012 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0038 0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0013 -0.0019 0.0081 
(-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.13) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.49) (0.07) (-0.57) (-0.17) (-0.26) (1.00) 
di2 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0093 -0.0104 -0.0073 -0.0096 
(-1.29) (-1.33) (-1.31) (-1.54) (-1.06) (-1.53) 
di3 0.0032 0.0032 0.0029 0.0034 0.0028 0.0032 
(0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.58) (0.51) (0.59) 
di4 0.0004 0.0007 0.0044 
(0.06) (0.11) (0.74) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.51 0.51 0.41 0.38 0.52 0.52 0.42 0.38 
Adj. R2 0.32 0.34 0.20 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.20 0.27 
System R2 0.86 0.72 0.70 
Jarque-Bera46 0.70 0.68 0.26 6.43 0.73 0.94 0.98 6.43 0.76 0.92 1.73 
Joint Koenker-Basset47 (F) 0.88 0.11 0.35 0.61 0.87 0.09 0.42 0.53 0.70 0.20 0.24 
Reset (F)48 6.70 6.66 5.59 7.54 5.48 5.51 2.39 7.54 3.45 2.45 0.83 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
46 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
47 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
48 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
71 
(-3.46) 
-0.0007 
(-0.14) 
42 
0.59 
6.18 
0.55 
5.24 
Table 4-14 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth 
Demand for Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Number of Subscribers plus the Waiting List 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -8.8562*** 9.8311** 6.2901 21.3046*** -9.1624*** 12.4631** 6.7490 23.8682*** -8.2499*** 16.3440*** 10.1654** 25.4457*** 
(-6.93) (2.28) (1.45) (4.61) (-6.40) (2.56) (1.33) (4.25) (-5.81) (3.54) (2.11) 
ln(GDP/POP) 1 .4019*** 1 .2200*** 1.4020*** 1.2149*** 1.3365*** 0.9922*** 
-23.72 (5.02) (24.86) (5.15) (24.14) (4.69) 
ln(PTel) 
-0.4931*** -0.8764 -0.6380 -0.9653 -0.4344** -1.3000* -0.6897 -1.3851 -0.4617** -1.6088** -0.7993 
(-3.41) (-1.47) (-1.12) (-1.28) (-2.51) (-1.84) (-1.01) (-1.51) (-2.69) (-2.38) (-1.19) 
ln(POP) 0.8803*** 0.7786*** 0.8772*** 0.7700*** 0.8680*** 0.6057*** 
(25.13) (5.71) (25.95) (5.79) (25.91) (5.19) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.96 0.41 0.47 0.03 0.97 0.42 0.47 0.05 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.38 0.44 0.01 0.96 0.39 0.45 0.03 
System R2 0.86 0.72 0.70 
Jarque-Bera49 3.08 0.42 2.13 0.52 4.07 0.37 2.08 0.53 4.16 0.03 1.27 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)50 0.88 0.11 0.35 0.61 0.87 0.09 0.42 0.53 0.70 0.20 0.24 
Reset (F)51 0.56 0.91 1. 71 1.42 0.55 1.72 1.75 1.42 0.51 2.12 1.97 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and I% respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
49 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
50 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
51 The 5% critical values for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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(4.87) 
-1.6435* 
(-1.92) 
42 
0.59 
0.63 
0.55 
1.41 
Table 4-15 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth 
Import of Telecommunication Equipment Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Import of Telecom Equipment 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.0261 -2.9672 2.0680 -3.5174 -2.9859 -3.5408 -3.3905 -4.4627* -2.6979 -3.9698* -3.1699 -2.4088 
(1.18) (-1.36) (1.21) (-1.57) (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.65) (-1.79) (-1.37) (-1.72) (-1.58) (-1.01) 
ln(GDP) -0.0036 0.7498*** -0.0264 0.7516*** 0.5290*** 0.7582*** 0.4971*** 0.7592*** 0.5288*** 0.7779*** 0.6036*** 0.6878*** 
(-0.03) (11.89) (-0.22) (11.50) (5.46) (12.73) (5.17) (12.14) (5.96) (14.22) (6.75) (11.85) 
ln(PTer) 0.8102*** 0.4325* 0.8332*** 0.4888* 0.6497** 0.4926* 0.7267*** 0.6114* 0.6628*** 0.5072* 0.6289** 0.5804* 
(4.42) (1.75) (4.69) (1.93) (2.60) (1.71) (2.92) (2.01) (2.75) (1.80) (2.58) (1.96) 
ln(Ex) -0.0174 -0.0766* -0.0526 -0.0755* -0. 0569* -0. 0 726** 
(-0.59) (-1.94) (-1.63) (-2.03) (-1.94) (-2.25) 
Op Tel 0.0867** 0.1475*** 0.0839** 0.1428*** 0.1036** 0.1457*** 0.09437** 0.1431*** 0.1131*** 0.1188*** 0.0617* 0.1381*** 
(2.65) (3.31) (2.61) (3.10) (2.68) (3.48) (2.43) (3.25) (3.12) (3.21) (1.81) (3.34) 
0.7977*** 0.8222*** 0.2976*** 0.3420*** 0.2708*** 0.2028** 
(6.25) (6.87) (2.75) (3.22) (2.73) (2.16) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.94 0.88 0.94 0.87 0.91 0.88 0.91 0.87 
Adj. R2 0.93 0.87 0.93 0.86 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.86 
System R2 0.86 0.72 0.70 
Jarque-Bera52 9.22 6.83 9.78 8.02 9.75 5.54 11.24 4.97 6.92 4.98 8.26 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)53 0.88 0.11 0.35 0.61 0.87 0.09 0.42 0.53 0.70 0.20 0.24 
Reset (F)54 1.90 0.63 1.65 0.17 2.20 0.60 1.60 0.15 2.15 0.69 1.73 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
52 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
53 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
54 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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42 
0.59 
2.93 
0.55 
0.15 
Table 4-16 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth 
Supply of Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Investment in Telecom Infrastructure plus Imports 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2~ (3) (4) 
Intercept 16.880*** 22.3345*** 18.7861**' 17.4725*** 20.9623'** 28.0981*** 21.5716*** 18.7922*** 19.7636*'* 29.0626*** 24.0533**' 24.1392*** 
(4.57) (6.03) (4.25) (4.77) (4.60) (6.31) (3.92) (4.27) (4.78) (7.22) (4.65) 
ln(PTeJ) 
-0.3230 -0.9382* -0.0470 0.0882 -0.9504 -1.8567*'* -0.4559 -0.1221 -0.8628 -1. 7834*** -0.7571 
(-0.61) (-1.69) (-0.07) (0.15) (-1.43) (-2.72) (-0.57) (-0.18) (-1.42) (-2.86) (-0.99) 
ln(GA) 0.3755*** 0.4540*** 0.3881*** 0.4587*** 0.4183*'* 0.3030*** 
(4.31) (4.81) (4.63) (4.93) (5.18) (4.02) 
ln(WL) -0.0661 -0.1526*** -0.0326 -0.0905* -0.1751*** -0.0479 -0.0592 -0.1212*** -0.0238 
(-1.31) (-3.14) (-0.54) (-1.77) (-3.59) (-0.79) (-1.32) (-3.03) (-0.45) 
Op Tel 0.2940*** 0.3965*** 0.4241*** 0.2573*** 0.3745*** 0.4187*** 0.2564*** 0.2406** 
(3.34) (3.87) (4.81) (2.92) (3.67) (4.88) (3.24) (2.66) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.59 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.59 0.48 0.38 0.38 
Adj. R2 0.54 0.42 0.33 0.35 0.54 0.44 0.33 0.34 
System R2 0.86 0.72 0.70 
Jarque-Bera55 0.01 0.35 0.75 0.55 0.28 1.19 0.84 0.53 1.00 0.72 0.39 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)56 0.88 0.11 0.35 0.61 0.87 0.09 0.42 0.53 0.70 0.20 0.24 
Reset (F)57 0.91 1.94 1.32 0.36 1.18 3.24 0.94 0.30 1.17 3.08 0.10 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and I% respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
55 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
56 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
57 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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(6.06) 
-0.7275 
(-1.13) 
0.1650**' 
(3.30) 
42 
0.59 
0.36 
0.55 
0.12 
Table 4-17 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth 
Demand for Financial Services Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Bank Assets to GDP Ratio 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.6077* 2.0929** 2.2198 -0.4008 2.6077* 2.0929** 2.2198 -0.4008 3.6712*** 2.9174*** 2.6756* 0.0597 
(1 86) (2.07) (1.51) (-0.38) (1.98) (2.18) (1.59) (-0.39) (2.84) (3.18) (1.97) (0.06) 
0.0237** 0.0237** 0.0015 0.0237** 0.0237** 0.0015 0.0223** 0.0237** 0.0013 
(2.28) (2.30) (0.14) (2.43) (2.42) (0.14) (2.39) (2.63) (0.13) 
ln(lnf) -0.3389*** -0.3467*** -0.2594*** -0.3389*** -0.3467*** -0.2594*** -0. 3233*** -0. 3594 *** -0. 2119*** 
(-4.42) (-4.65) (-3.60) (-4.71) (-4.89) (-3.79) (-4.66) (-5.40) (-3.23) 
ln(GDP/POP) 0.3363*** 0.3376*** 0.3821*** 0.5539*** 0.3363*** 0.3376*** 0.3821*** 0.5539*** 0.2654*** 0.2485** 0.3665*** 0.5027*** 
(3.16) (3.21) (3.47) (4.74) (3.37) (3.37) (3.65) (4.92) (2.72) (2.59) (3.60) 
ln(POP) -0.0311 -0.0309 -0.0311 -0.0309 -0.0580 -0.0558 
(-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-1.08) (-1.00) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.36 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.36 
Adj. R2 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.33 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.33 
System R2 0.86 0.72 0.70 
Jarque-Bera58 6.58 6.95 29.90 31.90 6.58 6.95 29.90 31.92 7.35 5.34 38.53 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)59 0.88 0.11 0.35 061 0.87 0.09 0.42 0.53 0.70 0.20 0.24 
Reset (F)°0 1.91 2.54 2.22 0.40 1.91 2.54 2.22 0.40 1.84 2.63 1.64 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
58 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
59 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
60 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
75 
(4.67) 
42 
0.59 
32.75 
0.55 
0.40 
Table 4-18 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth 
Supply of Financial Services Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Number of Banks per 100000 People 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.3240 -0.3336 -2.5608*** -0.3237 -0.3237 -0.3336 -2.5608*** -0.3237 0.2497 0.9986 -2.1093*** 
(-0.27) (-0.28) (-3.73) (-0.27) (-0.28) (-0.29) (-3.87) (-0.28) (0.22) (0.90) (-3.30) 
ln(GA) -0.1747** -0.1823** -0.1747** -0.1747** -0.1823** -0.1747** -0.1952** -0.2708*** 
(-2.20) (-2.36) (-2.20) (-2.31) (-2.45) (-2.31) (-2.64) (-3.78) 
OpF;nx ln(GNl89) 0.0293***0.0298*** 0.0316*** 0.0293***0.0293***0.0298*'* 0.0316*** 0.0293***0.0250*** 0.0259*** 0.0254** 
(2.99) (3.10) (3.10) (2.99) (3.15) (3.22) (3.22) (3.15) (2.90) (2.93) (2.68) 
-0.0085 -0.0162 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0162 -0.0085 -0.0154 -0.0247 
(-0.48) (-0.89) (-0.48) (-0.51) (-0.93) (-0.51) (-1.03) (-1.50) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.31 0.31 0.23 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.23 0.31 
Adj. R2 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.26 
System R2 0.86 0.72 0.70 
Jarque-Bera61 1.90 2.09 3.09 1.90 1.90 2.09 3.09 1.90 1.65 1.91 2.99 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F) 62 0.88 0.11 0.35 0.61 0.87 0.09 0.42 0.53 0.70 0.20 0.24 
Reset (F)°3 1.70 1.12 3.04 1.70 1.70 1.12 3.04 1.70 0.76 0.42 2.94 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
61 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
62 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
63 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
76 
(4) 
1.1053 
(1.07) 
-0.2381*** 
(-3.59) 
0.0195** 
(2.29) 
-0.0143 
(-0.93) 
42 
0.59 
1.57 
0.55 
0.35 
As in the previous model, the total effect of the openness in trade of telecommunication 
services and financial services on economic growth can be computed by taking the first 
partial derivative of growth with respect to each of the openness indices. The total effect 
of openness in trade of telecommunication services is equal on average to 0.00078 (with a 
standard error of 0.000851) indicating that an increase of one unit in the index will lead 
on average to an increase of 0.078 percentage point in the GNP per capita growth rate. 
The difference in results between the previous model and this one is in the sign of the 
total effect of openness in trade of telecommunication services. The dissimilarity in the 
signs is the result of the incorporation of the financial services in the model and 
accounting for any positive externality going from the telecommunication services to the 
financial services sector through the interaction variable. On the other hand, the total 
effect of the openness in trade of financial services is equal on average to -0.0026 (with a 
standard error of 0.00142) indicating that an increase of one unit in the financial index 
will lead on average to a decrease in GNP per capita growth by 0.26 percentage points. 
Computing the thresholds64 give a result of $11,527.81 for the telecommunication 
services sector and $117.82 for the financial services sector. This means that countries 
with an initial income per capita below $11,527.81 will benefit from openness in trade of 
telecommunication services. This result is quite reasonable since we expect the threshold 
to increase when we account for the positive externality. On the other hand, the threshold 
64 In order to compute the thresholds for the telecommunication services and the financial services sectors, 
we solved the following equations respectively for In GN/89: 
ac 
--.-1 = 0 .0065 - 0 .0001 ( Op Fin )( In GNJ 89) = 0 
aop" 
ac = 0.0031 - 0.0001 (Op r,, )(In GNJ 89) = 0 
aop 1-7,, 
where Op Fin and Op Tel are the averages of the openness indices of trade in financial and 
telecommunication services respectively. 
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for the financial services seems to be low, indicating that only countries with an initial 
per capita income below $117.82 will benefit from the openness in financial services. 
This might be the result of financial market structure being rather dissimilar across 
countries. Finally the total openness measure as well as the dummy variables are not 
significant. Parameter estimates of the demand for telecommunication services equation 
indicate that both average GDP per capita and the average total population are positively 
associated to the demand with a high significance level. Results of the estimation of the 
import of telecommunication equipment equation reveal that the parameter estimate of 
the average GDP is positively associated with import and highly significant indicating 
that the size of the economy is an important determinant of imports. The average 
exchange rate is negatively related to import at the 10 percent level. This result is 
conformable with the theory since we expect imports to decrease when the domestic 
currency depreciates. On the other hand, the coefficient estimate of the average price is 
positive and highly significant suggesting that an increase in the price of 
telecommunication services will lead to an increase in the import of telecommunication 
equipment. The parameter estimate in front of the openness in trade of 
telecommunication services is positive and highly significant which reflects the impact of 
openness in telecommunication services sector on the import of telecommunication 
equipment. Also, the coefficient estimate in front of the total number of subscriber and 
the waiting list is positive and highly significant indicating that import does respond to a 
high and unmet demand. Table 4-16 shows the results from the supply of 
telecommunication services equation estimation. The parameter estimate of the average 
price is negative. This is again surprising since it indicates that supply is inversely related 
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to the price. However the coefficient is not statistically significant ( except for model 2) 
suggesting that supply of telecommunication services is rather inelastic. This might be the 
result of the variety of market structure across countries. In fact, out of 42 countries, 16 
have their openness in telecommunication services index equal or below 5 and 16 have 
their index equal to 9, which suggest that there are big dissimilarities among the market 
structures in the studied sample. Coefficient estimate of the openness in trade of 
telecommunication services is positive and highly significant, suggesting that more 
openness leads to more supply of telecommunication services. This also indicates that 
countries with higher openness have on average a higher investment in 
telecommunication infrastructure and higher imports of telecommunication equipment 
since we measured the supply of telecommunication services by the sum of the 
investment of telecommunication infrastructure and the import of telecommunication 
equipment. The waiting list is negatively related to supply of telecommunication services 
and highly significant in model (2). This explains the fact that the reason behind the 
waiting lists is the shortage in the supply of telecommunication services. It is worth 
noting that the estimation results from equations (9'), (10'), and (11 ') do not change 
drastically between the previous and the integrated model. Table 4-17 presents the 
estimation results from the demand for banking services. The coefficient estimate of the 
average real interest rate is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This 
result is not surprising since it suggests that the lending real interest rate is high because 
of the high demand for bank loans and services. However, once we exclude the inflation 
rate from the regression as in model (4), the interest rate coefficient estimate becomes 
insignificant. Average inflation rate is inversely associated with demand for banking 
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operation at the one percent statistical level. This result is indeed surprising since one can 
expect a high demand for banking services during an economic expansion and usually 
inflation is associated with an economic expansion. However this result is attributed to 
the fact that the data sample is very diverse. Indeed, the data sample includes countries 
which experienced high inflation rate during the period 1989-2000 without experiencing 
an economic expansion. Coefficient estimate of the average GDP per capita is positive 
and highly significant suggesting that countries with higher GDP per capita have a higher 
demand for banking services. This result matches our expectation and indicates that the 
demand for banking services is income elastic. Finally the coefficient estimate of the 
average total population is negative but not statistically significant, indicating that the 
population level does not affect the demand for banking services. This result might be 
due to the fact that many developing countries have a large but poor population as 
opposed to developed countries with small but rich population. On average the impact of 
the size of the population on the demand of banking operations might not be captured 
because of the dissimilarity of the population size as well as the wealth of the population 
among the countries. 
Table 4-18 presents the results from the supply of banking operations equation 
estimation. The parameter estimate of the average geographical surface area is negative 
and highly significant. This result is unexpected since it suggests that larger countries 
have fewer banks than smaller countries. However, the result can be attributed to the 
nature of the measure of the supply of banking services and the technology development 
in developed countries. In the case of the former, recall that because of the lack of data 
reflecting the number of bank branches, we measured the supply of banking operations 
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by the number of banks in each country. This measure might not be as accurate as the 
number of branches since in many countries, because of strict banking regulations, banks 
are merging. Hence, if many banks are merging in a certain country, the number of banks 
will decline whereas the number of bank branches will remain the same assuming that 
after the mergers all the branches will stay in operation. In the case of the latter, the result 
may be credited to the new technology and the Internet connection, which boosted the use 
of Automated Teller Machines (ATM) and online banking. In countries like the USA or 
England, in order to serve their customers, many banks are relying on ATM machines 
and online banking instead of opening new branches. Indeed ATM machines and online 
banking are becoming cheaper to manage than a bank branch. Hence, measuring the 
supply of banking operations through the number of banks does not capture well the 
effect of the geographical surface area on the supply of banking services. The supply of 
banking services does not respond to the change in the average real lending interest rate. 
This might be because in most countries banks usually deal with nontraditional banking 
operations like insurance and stock exchange. Hence the lending operations might not be 
the major operation of the banks and lending interest rates might not be the only incentive 
for banks to open and operate. The coefficient estimate of the interaction variable is 
positive and highly significant suggesting that the effect of openness in trade of financial 
services on the supply of banking services does depend on the level of development of 
the country of interest, and the effect of development on the supply of banking services 
depends on the openness in trade of financial services. 
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The effect of development on the supply of financial services65 is equal to 0.1748 
(with a standard error of 0.059913) indicating that an increase of one percent in the 
logarithm of the initial GNP will lead to an increase in the number of banks by 0.1748 
percent. This states that more developed countries have more banks. This result matches 
our expectation since more developed countries are usually associated with a better 
financial structure than developing countries. 
Model Extensions 
The effect of Openness in Telecommunication Services on the Financial Services 
It is important to notice that the specification for equation (14') does not test for 
the extemality effect of openness in trade of telecommunication services on the 
financial services sector. One reason for testing for this extemality is that 
telecommunication is a network service. The more open a country is in trading 
telecommunication services, the easier the trade in financial services would be, and 
more banks might be willing to open and operate in this country. 
To test whether the extemality does exist, equation (14') is respecified as follow: 
65 The effect is computed as follows: 
O Jn B = 0 .025 X O Hn 
o In GNI 89 'P 
where Op Fin is the average of the openness in trade of financial services index. 
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where the interaction factor [ln(y j )Op ;in Op Tei] stresses the fact that the effect of 
openness in financial services on the supply of banking services depends on initial 
income and on the openness in trade of telecommunication services. 
Estimation Results 
The estimation results of (12')-(13') and (14") are given in tables 4-19, 4-20, 4-
21, 4-22, 4-23, and 4-24. The OLS results for the first 5 equations are the same as the 
results from the previous model since each equation is estimated separately. As 
expected, most of the 2SLS and 3SLS parameter estimates in equations (12')-(13') 
change slightly compared to the one of the previous model. Notice that the coefficient 
in front of the interaction factor in table 4-24 is still positive and significant at the 5% 
level. The total effect of openness in financial services on the supply of banking 
services66 is equal to 0.1077 (with a standard error of 0.042756) indicating that an 
increase in the index of openness of financial services by one unit leads to an increase 
in the logarithm of the number of banks by 0.1077 units (approximately an increase by 
one bank). On the other hand, the effect of development on the supply of banking 
services67 is equal to 0.0858 (with a standard error of 0.03406) indicating that an 
increase in the level of initial GNI by one percent leads to an increase in the supply of 
banking services by 0.0858 percent. This result is not surprising since one would expect 
66 The effect is computed as follows: 
oln~ =0.0019(0 Tel.lnGN/89) 
oOpFm 'P 
67 The effect is computed as follows: 
olnB = 0.0019(0 Fin .0 Tel) 
o In GN/89 'P 'P 
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Table 4-19 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth: Externality Effect 
Growth Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita GNP (1989-2000) 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable !1) !2) !3) !4) !1) !2) !3) !4) !1) !2) !3) !4) 
Intercept 0.0533 0.0566 0.0276 0.0514* 0.0583 0.0441 -0.0144 0.0514** 0.0295 0.0223 -0.0852 0.0406* 
(0.98) (1.45) (0.48) (1.90) (0.86) (1.13) (-0.21) (2.11) (0.45) (0.60) (-1.38) (1.74) 
ln(Gov) -0.0109 -0.0108 -0.0096 -0.0076 -0.0115 -0.0122* -0.0121 -0.0076 -0.0100 -0.0113* -0.0092 -0.0060 
(-1.33) (-1.35) (-1.09) (-1.00) (-1.65) (-1.75) (-1.52). (-1.11) (-1.49) (-1.72) (-1.29) (-0.90) 
ln(inf) -0.0026 -0.0026* -0.0022 -0.0036** -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0036*** -0.0008 -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0029** 
(-1.42) (-1.67) (-1.11) (-2.55) (-1.30) (-1.27) (-0.65) (-2.83) (-0.51) (-0.31) (0.11) (-2.33) 
Pop -0.0059* -0.0059* -0.0060* -0.0067** -0.0056* -0.0052* -0.0042 -0.0067** -0.0060** -0.0053* -0.0036 -0.0065** 
(-1.87) (-1.91) (-1.77) (-2.32) (-1.91) (-1.86) (-1.28) (-2.58) (-2.13) (-2.03) (-1.25) (-2.60) 
ln(invT"') -0.0007 -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0008 0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0006 0.0027 
(-0.45) (-0.62) (0.01) (-0.53) (-0.55) (0.49) (-0.41) (-0.45) (1.31) 
ln(bankass/GDP) 0.0041 0.0041 0.0035 0.0066* 0.0072** 0.0085* 0.0077* 0.0091 *** 0.0117*** 
(1.32) (1.42) (1.06) (1.71) (2.17) (1.95) (2.03) (2.90) (2.99) 
ln(Op) 0.0005 0.0021 -0.0011 0.0025 0.0008 0.0040 
(0.09) (0.38) (-0.21) (0.42) (0.15) (0.75) 
Op Tel 0.0061** 0.0061*** 0.0054** 0.0057** 0.0062*** 0.0061*** 0.0053** 0.0057*** 0.0065*** 0.0065*** 0.0057** 0.0066*** 
(2.62) (2.79) (2.19) (2.53) (3.08) (3.23) (2.36) (2.82) (3.32) (3.63) (2.81) (3.36) 
Op Fin 0.0027 0.0027 0.0028 0.0030* 0.0025* 0.0026* 0.0029* 0.0030* 0.0027* 0.0027* 0.0036** 0.0031** 
(1.57) (1.59) (1.49) (1.75) (1.67) (1.74) (1.70) (1.94) (1.88) (1.90) (2.38) (2.08) 
Op Tel x OpF'"x ln(GNl89) -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(-2.71) (-2.87) (-2.25) (-2.77) (-3.24) (-3.31) (-2.65) (-3.08) (-3.35) (-3.44) (-3.23) 
di1 -0.0048 -0.0049 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0038 0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0009 -0.0014 0.0081 
(-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.13) (-0.51) (-0.49) (-0.49) (0.07) (-0.57) (-0.12) (-0.20) (1.01) 
di2 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0093 -0.0104 -0.0069 -0.0092 
(-1.29) (-1.33) (-1.31) (-1.54) (-1.01) (-1.45) 
di3 0.0032 0.0032 0.0029 0.0034 0.0031 0.0035 
(0.47) (0.47) (0.50) (0.58) (0.55) (0.65) 
di4 0.0004 0.0007 0.0048 
(-0.06) (0.11) (0.82) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.51 0.51 0.41 0.38 0.51 0.52 0.42 0.38 
Adj. R2 0.32 0.34 0.20 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.20 0.25 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.69 
Jarque-Bera66 0.70 0.68 0.26 6.43 0.73 0.94 0.98 6.43 0.65 0.81 1.64 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)69 0.86 0.11 0.65 0.59 0.84 0.09 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.19 0.57 
Reset !f)70 6.70 6.66 5.59 7.54 5.48 5.51 2.39 7.54 3.66 2.56 1.05 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
68 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99 
69 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10 
70 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
84 
(-3.37) 
-0.0010 
(-0.20) 
42 
0.58 
6.60 
0.54 
5.41 
Table 4-20 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth: Externality Effect 
Demand for Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Number of Subscribers plus the Waiting List 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -8.8562*** 9.8311 ** 6.2901 21.3046*** -9.1624*** 12.4631** 6.7490 23.8682*** -8.2917*** 16.4279*** 10.3179'* 25.6730' 
(-6.93) (2.28) (1.45) (4.61) (-6.40) (2.56) (1.33) (4.25) (-5.84) (3.54) (2.16) 
ln(GDP/POP) 1.4019*** 1.2200··· 1.4020*** 1.2149*'* 1.3400**' 0.9988*** 
(23.72) (5.02) (24.86) (5.15) (24.18) (4.71) 
ln(avprice) -0.4931*" -0.8764 -0.6379 -0.9653 -0.4344** -1.2999* -0.6897 -1.3851 -0.4625** -1.6321** -0.8511 
(-3.41) (-1.47) (-1.12) (-1.28) (-2.51) (-1.84) (-1.01) (-1.51) (-2.69) (-2.39) (-1.28) 
ln(POP) 0.8803*" 0.7786*** 0.8772"* 0.7700*** 0.8686*** 0.6155*** 
(25.13) (5. 71) (25.95) (5.79) (25.94) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.96 0.41 0.47 0.03 0.96 0.42 0.47 0.05 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.38 0.44 0.01 0.96 0.39 0.45 0.02 
System R2 0.86 0.71 
Jarque-Bera71 3.08 0.42 2.13 0.52 4.07 0.36 2.08 0.53 4.15 0.04 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)72 0.86 0.11 0.65 0.59 0.84 0.09 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.19 
Reset (F)73 0.56 0.91 1.71 1.42 0.55 1.72 1.75 1.42 0.51 2.12 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
71 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
72 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
73 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
85 
(5.32) 
42 
0.69 
1.30 
0.57 
2.01 
(4.89) 
-1.6807 
(-1.96) 
42 
0.58 
0.64 
0.54 
1.41 
Table 4-21 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth: Externality Effect 
Import of Telecommunication Equipment Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Import of Telecom Equipment 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.0261 -2.9672 2.0680 -3.5175 -2.9860 -3.5407 -3.3905 -4.4627* -2.5102 -3.8401 -3.1816 -2.1956 
(1.18) (-1.36) (1.21) (-1.57) (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.65) (-1.79) (-1.26) (-1.65) (-1.57) (-0.91) 
ln(GDP) -0.0036 0.7498*** -0.0264 0.7516*** 0.5290*** 0.7582*** 0.4971*** 0.7592*** 0.5127*** 0.7743*** 0.5987*** 0.6819*** 
(-0.03) (11.89) (-0.22) (11.50) (5.46) (12.73) (5.17) (12.14) (5.68) (14.04) (6.61) 
ln(PTel) 0.8102*** 0.4325* 0.8332*** 0.4888* 0.6497** 0.4926* 0.7267*** 0.6114* 0.6638** 0.5004* 0.6281** 
(4.42) (1.75) (4.69) (1.93) (2.60) (1.71) (2.92) (2.01) (2.71) (1.76) (2.56) 
ln(Ex) -0.0174 -0.0766* -0.0526 -0.0755** -0.0558* -0.0711** 
(-0.59) (-1.94) (-1.63) (-2.03) (-1.87) (-2.17) 
OpT~ 0.0867** 0.1475*** 0.0839** 0.1428*** 0.1036** 0.1457*** 0.0944** 0.1431*** 0.1059*** 0.1191*** 0.0624* 
(2.65) (3.31) (2.61) (3.10) (2.68) (3.48) (2.43) (3.25) (2.86) (3.17) (1.79) 
' 
ln(Lsub; + "'> 
l=I 
0.7977*** 0.8222*** 0.2976*** 0.3420*** 0.2880*** 0.2117** 
(6.25) (6.87) (2.75) (3.22) (2.87) (2.22) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.94 0.88 0.94 0.87 0.91 0.88 0.91 0.87 
Adj. R2 0.93 0.87 0.93 0.86 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.86 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.69 
Jarque-Bera 74 9.22 6.83 9.78 8.03 9.74 5.54 11.24 4.97 7.33 5.08 9.02 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)'5 0.86 0.11 0.65 0.59 0.84 0.09 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.19 0.57 
Reset (F)76 1.90 0.63 1.65 0.17 2.20 0.60 1.60 0.15 2.17 0.68 1.74 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
74 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
75 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
76 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
86 
(11.65) 
0.5674* 
(1.90) 
0.1409*** 
(3.35) 
42 
0.58 
2.99 
0.54 
0.15 
Table 4-22 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth: Externality Effect 
Supply of Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Investment in Telecom Infrastructure plus Imports 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 16.8180*** 22.3345*** 18.7861*** 17.4725*** 20.9623*** 28.0981*** 21.5716*** 18.7922*** 19.2307*** 29.3646*** 23.9505*** 24.394, 
(4.57) (6.03) (4.25) (4.77) (4.60) (6.31) (3.92) (4.27) (4.78) (7.26) (4.65) 
ln(PTet) 
-0.3230 -0.9383* -0.0470 0.0882 -0.9504 -1.8567** -0.4559 -0.1221 -0.8089 -1.8262*** -0.7541 
(-0.61) (-1.69) (-0.07) (0.15) (-1.43) (-2.72) (-0.57) (-0.18) (-1.37) (-2.92) (-0.99) 
ln(GA) 0.3755*** 0.4540*** 0.3881*** 0.4587*** 0.4080*** 0.3022*** 
(4.31) (4.81) (4.63) (4.93) (5.05) (4.00) 
ln(WL) -0.0661 -0.1526*** -0.0326 -0.0905* -0.1752*** -0.0479 -0.0496 -0.1244••• -0.0191 
(-1.31) (-3.14) (-0.54) (-1.77) (-3.59) (-0.79) (-1.14) (-3.08) (-0.36) 
Op Tel 0.2940*** 0.3965*** 0.4241*** 0.2573*** 0.3745*** 0.4187-· 0.2934*** 0.2467*** 
(3.34) (3.87) (4.81) (2.92) (3.67) (4.88) (3.70) (2.72) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.59 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.59 0.48 0.38 0.38 
Adj. R2 0.54 0.42 0.33 0.35 0.54 0.44 0.33 0.34 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.69 
Jarque-Bera 77 0.01 0.35 0.75 0.55 0.28 1.19 0.84 0.53 0.73 0.71 0.35 
Joint Koenker-
Basset (F)78 0.86 0.11 0.65 0.59 0.84 0.09 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.19 0.57 
Reset (F)79 0.91 1.94 1.32 0.36 1.18 3.24 0.94 0.30 1.15 3.02 0.09 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
77 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
78 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
79 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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Table 4-23 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth: Externality Effect 
Demand for Financial Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Bank Assets to GDP Ratio 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) !1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.6078* 2.0930** 2.2198 -0.4008 2.6077* 2.0929** 2.2198 -0.4008 3.6158*** 2.8901*** 2.6197* O.o?, 
(1.86) (2.07) (1.51) (-0.38) (1.98) (2.18) (1.59) (-0.39) (2.79) (3.15) (1.94) (0.0: 
0.0237** 0.0237••• 0.0015 0.0237** 0.0237** 0.0015 0.0220•• 0.0234** 0.00 
(2.28) (2.30) (0.14) (2.43) (2.42) (0.14) (2.36) (2.60) (0.1: 
ln(lnf) -0.3389*** -0.3470*** -0.2594*** -0.3389*** -0.3467*** -0.2594*** -0.3218*** -0.3535*** -0.2123*** 
(-4.42) (4.65) (-3.60) (-4.71) (-4.89) (-3.79) (-4.64) (-5.32) (-3.25) 
ln(GDP/POP) 0.3363*** 0.3376*** 0.3821 *** 0.5539*** 0.3363*** 0.3376*** 0.3821*** 0.5539*** 0.2693*** 0.2504** 0.3586*** 0.501' 
(3.16) (3.21) (3.47) (4.74) (3.37) (3.37) (3.65) (4.92) (2.76) (2.61) 
ln(POP) -0.0311 -0.0309 -0.0311 -0.0310 -0.0569 
(-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-1.06) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.36 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.36 
Adj. R2 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.33 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.33 
System R2 0.86 0.71 
Jarque-Bera00 6.58 6.95 29.9 31.92 6.58 6.95 29.9 31.92 7.66 5.94 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)61 0.86 0.11 0.65 0.59 0.84 0.09 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.19 
Reset (F)62 1.91 2.54 2.22 0.40 1.91 2.54 2.22 0.40 1.85 2.62 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
80The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
81 The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
82 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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Table 4-24 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth: Externality Effect 
Supply of Financial Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Number of Banks per 100000 People 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Pl (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.1525 1.1554 -1.4496*** 1.1525 1.1525 1.1554 -1.4496*** 1.1525 1.3561 2.1365** -0.8787** 2.4024*' 
(1.14) (1.15) (-3.11) (1.14) (1.19) (1.20) (-3.23) (1.19) (1.42) (2.28) (-2.03) 
ln(GA) -0.2284*** -0.2328*** -0.2284*** -0.2284*** -0.2328*** -0.22874*** -0.2264*** -0.2917*** 
(-2.83) (-3.00) (-2.83) (-2.97) (-3.11) (-2.97) (-3.00) (-4.02) 
OpFin x Op Tel x log(GNl89) 0.0023••• 0.0023••• 0.0020·· 0.0023••• 0.0023••• 0.0023••• 0.0020·· 0.0023••• 0.0019•• 0.0017•• 0.0009 
(2.78) (2.92) (2.25) (2.78) (2.92) (3.03) (2.34) (2.92) (2.52) (2.30) (1.07) 
-0.0043 -0.0162 -0.0043 -0.0043 -0.0162 -0.0043 -0.0133 -0.0291* 
(-0.24) (-0.85) (-0.24) (-0.25) (-0.88) (-0.25) (-0.88) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R' 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.29 
Adj. R2 0.24 0.26 0.10 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.10 0.24 
System R2 0.86 0.71 
Jarque-Bera83 2.27 2.41 3.00 2.27 2.27 2.41 3.00 2.27 2.02 2.28 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)84 0.86 0.11 0.65 0.59 0.84 0.09 0.73 0.51 0.72 0.19 
Reset (F)85 1.09 1.02 2.77 1.09 1.09 1.02 2.77 1.09 0.36 0.82 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
83The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
84The 5% critical value for the Joint Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
85 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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(-1.68) 
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2.54 
0.57 
0.10 
(2.87) 
-0.2855' 
(-4.37) 
0.0012 
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-0.016( 
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that the more developed a country is, the more enhanced its banking supply 
infrastructure. The extemality effect of the openness in trade of telecommunication 
services on the supply of banking services86 is equal to 0.1152 (with a standard error of 
0.045716) indicating that an increase of the index of openness in trade of 
telecommunication services by one unit leads to and increase in the logarithm of the 
number of banks by 0.1152 (approximately an increase by one bank). 
It is worth noticing that geographical area is still inversely related to the quantity 
supplied of financial services and highly significant. Indeed, the parameter estimate 
suggests that an increase in geographical area by one percent leads to a decrease in the 
number of banks by 0.2264 percent. 
The Effect of Openness in Trade in Services on Economic Growth 
As an alternative exploration for the model, we construct a composite index for 
openness in trade of services. The composite index is simply the unweighted average of 
the telecommunication and financial services indices scaled on a range of 1 to 10. The 
new model to be estimated becomes as follows: 
GNP growth equation: 
(l 2") Gj =a0 +a1 lnGo~ +a2I~ +a3pOJJ.i +a4 lnlnife1 +a5 ln(BAj I GDIJ)+a6 ln0pj +a70//rv 
+ a8 [ln(y j )OpJerv] + e) 
Demand for telecommunication services equation: 
5 
(9") ln(LSubij + WLj) = b0 + b1 ln(GDPj I POP)+ b2 lnPt1 + b3 lnPOPj + eJ 
i=l 
86 The effect is computed as follows: 
olnB =0.0019(0pFin.lnGNI89) 
olnOpTel . 
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Import of telecommunication equipment equation: 
lnMiel =Co+ c, lnGDPj + C2 lnPt1 + C3 lnExj + C40pJerv 
(10") 5 
+c5 ln(LSub1; + WLj) + sJ 
i=I 
Supply of telecommunication services equation: 
Demand for banking services equation: 
Supply of banking services equation: 
where OpJerv is the unweighted average of the telecommunication and financial services 
openness indices scaled over 10. To check for identification, the order condition of 
identifiability was used. The model is indeed identified (For each specification). A 
Hausman specification error test was used to test for simultaneity (Gujaraty, 2003, 
pp.754-756). This test was done by estimating the reduced form regressions for the 
investment in telecommunication infrastructure and the total bank asset to GDP ratio. 
From those regressions, the calculated residuals were then included in the GNP growth 
equation. A joint F test was used to test the null hypothesis that simultaneity does not 
exist for both variables. The calculated F statistic was significant at the 5 percent level 
for models (2) and (3)87• This result emphasizes Roller and Waverman (2001) argument 
that the model should be estimated with a simultaneous regression approach. 
87 The test was not done for model (4) because in the growth equation of model (4) investments in 
telecommunication infrastructure as well as the bank assets to GDP ratio were excluded. 
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Estimation Results 
Regressions results are shown in Tables 4-25, 4-26, 4-27, 4-28, 4-29, and 4-30. 
The parameter estimates88 of the aggregate growth production function reveal that both 
the composite index for openness in trade of services and the interaction factor are 
highly significant. The total effect of openness in trade in services on economic growth 
is equal to -0.00095 (with a standard error of 0.001082), indicating that an increase of 
one unit in the composite index of openness in services trade leads to a decrease of 
0.095 percentage points in GNP per capita growth. As seen in the first part of the study, 
this result appears to be similar to the one we encountered with the openness in 
telecommunication and growth model. In order to investigate the reason behind the 
negative sign of the total effect of openness in trade of services on economic growth, 
we computed the threshold which is equal to $3,828; suggesting that countries that have 
an initial income (GNP per capita in 1989 adjusted for PPP) above $3,828 are hurt from 
openness in trade of services whereas countries that have an initial per capita GNP 
under $3,828 will benefit from openness in trade of services. Following Mattoo 
Rathindran and Subramanian (2001), we hypothesize that the negative total effect of 
openness in trade of services on growth is attributed to the decrease in employment of 
national factors of production. It is worth noting that the parameter estimates of the 
logarithm of the ratio of the bank assets to GDP is positive and highly statistically 
significant, indicating that an increase of one unit in this variable leads to an increase of 
0.93 percentage point in the per capita income growth. On the other hand, although the 
parameter estimate of the logarithm of investment is not statistically significant, it is 
still promising that the sign of the coefficient is positive suggesting that the more 
88 Only the 3SLS results will be discussed. 
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investment in telecommunication infrastructure a nation has, the higher the growth rate 
of GNP per capita will be. 
Results of the estimation of the demand for telecommunication services equation 
are reported in table 4-26. The parameter estimate of GDP appears to be positive and 
significantly associated with the quantity demanded of telecommunication services. 
This suggests that an increase in income per capita by one percent leads to an increase 
in the quantity demanded of telecommunication services by 1.35 percent. Since the 
income elasticity is positive, we can support our statement that telecommunication 
services are normal goods. Estimate of the price coefficient is negative and significant 
at the 10 percent statistical level. It is important to notice that the own price elasticity of 
telecommunication services is less than one suggesting that the telecommunication 
services demand is inelastic. 
Results for the import of telecommunication equipment equation show that the 
estimate of the average price coefficient is positive suggesting that an increase of one 
percent in the average price of telecommunication services leads to an increase of 0.40 
percent in the import of telecommunication equipment. It is worth noting that the 
exchange rate is still significant at the 10 percent level and negatively associated with 
imports. Estimate of the composite coefficient is positive and highly significant 
indicating that a one unit increase in the openness in trade of services lead to a 0.15 unit 
increase in the logarithm of the import of telecommunication equipment. Also the 
coefficient estimate of the total subscribers is positive and highly significant. Those 
results are reassuring since they are comparable to the ones we obtained in previous 
model estimations. 
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Results for the supply of telecommunication services equation are shown in Table 
4-28. Although the results are very comparable to the previous ones, it is important to 
note that the parameter estimate of the composite coefficient is positive and highly 
associated with the supply of telecommunication services. On the other hand, the 
coefficient estimate of the waiting list is negative, suggesting that the larger the waiting 
list is the less supply of telecommunication services the nation has. However this 
coefficient is not statistically significant. 
The demand for banking services equation estimation results show that interest 
rate is associated with the bank assets to GDP ratio. The coefficient estimate of 0.0204 
indicates that an increase in the interest rate by one percent leads to an increase in the 
logarithm of the bank assets to GDP ratio by 0.0204 units. As explained in the previous 
results, this outcome is expected since one can anticipate a rise in real lending interest 
rate when the demand for loans is high. The coefficient estimate of the inflation rate is 
negative and highly significant, indicating that an increase of the inflation rate by one 
percent leads to a decrease in the bank assets to GDP ratio by 0.3141 percent. This 
result was not expected since one can expect a higher demand for loans during an 
economic expansion leading to higher inflation rate. However, this result is attributed to 
the diversity of the data sample. On the other hand an increase of one percent of the 
income leads to an increase of 0.3161 percent in the demand for banking services. This 
outcome is not surprising since countries with higher income usually have more 
investment activities leading to more demand for loans. 
Results for the supply of banking services equation estimation show that the 
geographical area is highly associated with the number of banks in a country. The 
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coefficient estimate of the geographical area suggests that a one percent increase in the 
geographical area leads to a 0.2158 percent decrease in the number of banks. As 
explained for the previous results, this outcome can be attributed to two reasons. The 
first reason is related to the regulation of the banking industry in certain countries. An 
example would be Canada, which has a larger geographical area but very few banks. 
The second reason is related to technology and the barriers to entry into the banking 
industry in certain countries. The effect of openness in trade in services on the supply 
of banking services89 is equal to 0.1640 (with a standard error of 0.065087) meaning 
that an increase of one unit in the composite index leads to an increase of 0.1640 in the 
logarithm of number of banks (approximately an increase by one bank). This result is 
reasonable since banks would be willing to enter the market in more developed 
countries where the telecommunication industry is more developed and competitively 
opened to international trade. On the other hand, the effect of development on the 
supply of banking services90 is equal to 0.1489 (with a standard error of 0.059085) 
meaning that an increase of one percent in the initial GNP per capita leads to a 0.1489 
percent increase in the number of banks once we take into consideration the openness 
in trade of services. This result is also expected since one can conjecture that the more 
developed the country is the more banks it has. However this statement should have 
89 The effect is computed as follows: 
oln: = 0.0188(1nGNJ89) 
oOp erv 
90 The effect is computed as follows: 
olnB -- 0.01880 Serv where O Serv 0 1n GN/89 'P 'P is the average of the composite index for openness in 
trade of services. 
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some reservation since some of the developed countries in our sample still have a 
limited number of banks. 
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Table 4-25 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth with a Composite index 
Growth Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Growth of Per Capita GNP (1989-2000) 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.0390 0.0685* 0.0243 0.0810*** 0.0527 0.0541 0.0032 0.0810*** -0.0130 0.0259 -0.0704 0.0728*** 
(0.76) (1.87) (0.42) (3.30) (0.87) (1.45) (0.05) (3.62) (-0.24) (0.72) (-1.11) (3.30) 
ln(Gov) -0.0155** -0.0159** -0.0138 -0.0121* -0.0168** -0.0181** -0.016** -0.0121* -0.0164** -0.0170** -0.0124* -0.0109 
(-2.09) (-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.65) (-2.54) (-2.72) (-2.06) (-1.81) (-2.58) (-2.68) (-1.74) (-1.65) 
ln(inf) -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0012-0.0029** -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0029** 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0025* 
(-1.10) (-1.61) (-0.60) (-2.02) (-0.89) (-0.96) (-0.12) (-2.21) (0.07) (-0.21) (0.62) (-1.94) 
Pop -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0053 -0.0063** -0.0045* -0.0037 -0.0039 -0.0063** -0.0041 -0.0038 -0.0033 -0.0060** 
(-1.62) (-1.59) (-1.59) (-2.08) (-1.71) (-1.38) (-1.23) (-2.27) (-1.62) (-1.49) (-1.15) (-2.21) 
ln(inv) 0.0015 0.0009 0.0011 0.0006 0.0007 0.0014 0.0022 0.0011 0.0031 
(0.96) (0.64) (0.61) (0.27) (0.50) (0.58) (1.16) (0.72) (1.35) 
ln(bankass/GDP) 0.0036 0.0042 0.0031 0.0058 0.0083** 0.0083* 0.0093** 0.0112*** 0.0117*** 
(1.20) (1.46) (0.90) (1.49) (2.44) (1.84) (2.67) (3.45) (2.86) 
ln(Op) 0.0040 0.0053 0.0022 0.0042 0.0060 0.0073 
(0.83) (0.97) (0.46) (0.73) (1.28) (1.40) 
OpSeN 0.0154*** 0.0154*** 0.0075 0.0067 0.0131** 0.0152*** 0.0082 0.0067* 0.0165*** 0.0162*** 0.0126** 0.0086** 
(2.77) (2.78) (1.31) (1.61) (2.61) (2.89) (1.43) (1.77) (3.28) (3.24) (2.43) (2.32) 
Op8 en1 x ln(GNl89) -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.0008 -0.0007* -0.0015** -0.0018*** -0.0010 -0.0007* -0.0020*** -0.0019*** -0.0015** -0.0009** 
(-2.77) (-2.80) (-1.26) (-1.71) (-2.53) (-2.86) (-1.39) (-1.88) (-3.22) (-3.13) (-2.36) 
di1 -0.0287** -0.0296** -0.0091 -0.0091 -0.0235* -0.0280** -0.0091 -0.0091 -0.0276** -0.0252** -0.0101 
(-2.06) (-2.14) (-0.64) (-1.33) (-1.91) (-2.18) (-0.67) (-1.46) (-2.28) (-2.06) (-0.82) 
di2 -0.0251 ** -0.0254** -0.0203** -0.0253** -0.0242** -0.0227** 
(-2.28) (-2.33) (-2.14) (-2.52) (-2.57) (-2.38) 
di3 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0039 -0.0053 -0.0059 -0.0043 
(-0.68) (-0.68) (-0.52) (-0.70) (-0.82) (-0.59) 
di4 -0.0014 -0.0021 -0.0017 
(-0.15) (-0.23) (-0.21) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.52 0.50 0.35 0.30 0.50 0.51 0.35 0.30 
Adj. R2 0.34 0.35 0.14 0.18 0.32 0.35 0.15 0.18 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.70 
Jarque-Bera91 1.31 1.42 0.31 5.27 1.02 1.56 0.41 5.27 1.92 1.53 0.99 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)92 0.98 0.25 0.61 0.55 0.83 0.36 0.67 0.57 0.85 0.31 0.65 
Reset (F)93 4.59 3.56 1.26 2.57 4.32 4.20 0.36 2.59 2.21 1.77 0.61 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
91 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
92 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
93 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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(-2.33) 
-0.0093 
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Table 4-26 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth with a Composite index 
Demand for Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Number of.Subscribers plus the Waiting List 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -8.8562*** 9.8311** 6.2901 21.3046*** -10.1456*** 9.1213* 5.5676 19.7939*** -9.3184*** 13.1656** 8.6216* 21.4955' 
(-6.93) (2.28) (1.45) (4.61) (-6.76) (1.72) (1.05) (3.06) (-6.29) (2.58) (1.69) 
ln(GDP) 1.4019*** 1.2200··· 1.4060*** 1.2214*** 1.3500*** 1.0080*** 
(23.72) (5.02) (24.51) (5.21) (23.79) (4.63) 
ln(Pr"') 
-0.4931*** -0.8764 -0.6379 -0.9653 -0.3139 -0.7622 -0.5488 -0.7179 -0.3252* -1.1114 -0.5785 
(-3.41) (-1.47) (-1.12) (-1.28) (-1.59) (-0.98) (-0.71) (-0.68) (-1.70) (-1.46) (-0.77) 
ln(POP) 0.8803*** 0.7786*** 0.8898*** 0.7892*** 0.8745*** 0.6174*** 
(25.13) (5.71) (26.28) (6.02 (25.90) (5.27) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.96 0.41 0.47 0.03 0.96 0.40 0.47 0.01 
Adj. R2 0.96 0.38 0.44 0.01 0.96 0.37 0.44 0.01 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.70 
Jarque-Bera94 3.08 0.42 2.13 0.52 6.83 0.42 2.22 0.60 7.20 0.15 1.41 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)95 0.98 0.25 0.61 0.55 0.83 0.36 0.67 0.57 0.85 0.31 0.65 
Reset (F)95 0.56 0.91 1.71 1.42 0.51 0.72 1.64 1.37 0.49 1.79 1.77 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
94 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
95 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
96 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
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Table 4-27 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth with a Composite Index 
Import of Telecommunication Equipment Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Import of Telecom Equipment 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 1.5025 -3.2640 1.5440 -3.6764* -1.9208 -2.7325 -2.3440 -3.6496 -0.8360 -1.3672 -1.5824 -1.5412 
(0.88) (-1.60) (0.92) (-1.77) (-0.97) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.53) (-0.44) (-0.62) (-0.81) (-0.66) 
ln(GDP) 0.0444 0.7468*** 0.0260 0.7436*** 0.5128*** 0.7427*** 0.4887*** 0.7354*** 0.4637*** 0.6754*** 0.5360*** 0.6498*** 
(0.35) (12.97) (0.21) (12.60) (5.99) (13.75) (5.75) (13.13) (5.63) (13.90) (6.61) (12.33) 
ln(PTel) 0.7467*** 0.3685 0.7661*** 0.4190* 0.4344 0.2983 0.5175* 0.4438 0.4033 0.3049 0.4343 0.4662 
(4.13) (1.59) (4.39) (1.78) (1.64) (1.00) (1.98) (1.38) (1.63) (1.03) (1.67) (1.46) 
ln(Ex) -0.0136 -0.0643* -0.0468 -0.0656* -0.0518* -0.0561* 
(-0.48) (-1.73) (-1.54) (-1.86) (-1.85) (-1.95) 
Op Seo, 0.1213*** 0.2140*** 0.1196** 0.2172*** 0.1511*** 0.2146*** 0.1481*** 0.2213*** 0.1532*** 0.2522*** 0.1067** 0.2154**' 
(2.93) (4.09) (2.93) (4.05) (3.24) (4.36) (3.15) (4.32) (3.45) (5.27) (2.45) 
In( t. sub, + ;,J) 0.7505*** 0.7695*** 0.3060*** 0.3347*** 0.3295*** 0.2607*** 
(5.78) (6.30) (3.14) (3.47) (3.57) (2.93) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.89 
Adj. R2 0.94 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.91 0.88 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.70 
Jarque-Bera97 16.67 7.03 17.61 10.53 33.26 9.09 35.82 8.98 31.74 4.36 34.54 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F)98 0.98 0.25 0.61 0.55 0.83 0.36 0.67 0.57 0.85 0.31 0.65 
Reset (F)°9 1.08 0.29 0.93 0.09 1.38 0.34 1.10 0.08 1.37 0.26 1.26 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
97 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
98 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
99 The 5% critical value for the F statistic 3.0. 
99 
(4.36) 
42 
0.59 
3.17 
0.62 
0.07 
Table 4-28 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth with a Composite Index 
Supply of Telecommunication Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Investment in Telecom Infrastructure plus Imports 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 15.7500*** 15.7500*** 18.9320*** 17.6469*** 15.6587*** 17.3383*** 17.2187** 15.2542*** 16.7681*** 17.8639*** 19.3319*** 20.8117*** 
(4.26) (4.26) (4.10) (4.68) (3.05) (3.54) (2.60) (2.95) (3.78) (4.30) (3.05) 
ln(Prei) 
-0.4449 -0.4449 -0.2763 -0.1611 -0.4314 -0.6787 -0.0284 0.2223 -0.6934 -0.5067 -0.1701 
(-0.89) (-0.89) (-0.43) (-0.28) (-0.59) (-0.98) (-0.03) (0.27) (-1.10) (-0.83) (-0.19) 
ln(GA) 0.4099*** 0.4099*** 0.4098*** 0.4125*** 0.4295*** 0.24499*** 
(4.94) (4.94) (5.25) (5.27) (5.63) (3.80) 
ln(WL) -0.0544 -0.0545 -0.0311 -0.0539 -0.0632 -0.0219 -0.0347 -0.0153 -0.0043 
(-1.09) (-1.09) (-0.49) (-1.05) (-1.24) (-0.33) (-0.79) (-0.42) (-0.07) 
OpSeN 0.4028*** 0.4028*** 0.4825*** 0.5188*** 0.4036*** 0.3888*** 0.4968*** 0.5253*** 0.4117*** 0.3940*** 0.3180** 
(3.64) (3.64) (3.47) (4.45) (3.70) (3.59) (3.58) (4.63) (4.10) (4.33) (2.50) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.36 0.34 0.60 0.60 0.34 0.34 
Adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.29 0.31 0.56 0.56 0.29 0.31 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.70 
Jarque-
Bera 100 0.53 0.53 1.64 1.57 0.53 0.55 1.45 1.22 0.86 0.65 0.86 
Joint 
Koenker-
Basset (F) 101 0.98 0.25 0.61 0.55 0.83 0.36 0.67 0.57 0.85 0.31 0.65 
Reset ( F) 102 0.24 0.24 1.49 0.98 0.24 0.32 1.94 1.95 0.32 0.24 0.87 
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
100 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
101 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
102 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
100 
(4.48) 
-0.2725 
(-0.36) 
0.2049*** 
(3.09) 
42 
0.59 
0.74 
0.62 
0.32 
Table 4-29 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth with a Composite INdex 
Demand for Financial Services Equation Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Bank Assets to GDP Ratio 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 2.6077* 2.0929** 2.2198 -0.4008 2.6077* 2.0928** 2.2198 -0.4008 3.0990** 2.1095** 1.8827 -0.23: 
(1.86) (2.07) (1.51) (-0.38) (1.98) (2.18) (1.59) (-0.39) (2.38) (2.23) (1.39) (-0.2· 
0.0237** 0.0237** 0.0015 0.0237** 0.0237** 0.0015 0.0204** 0.0191** o.oo: 
(2.28) (2.30) (0.14) (2.43) (2.42) (0.14) (2.17) (2.07) (0.3( 
ln(lnf) -0.3389*** -0.3467*** -0.2594*** -0.3389*** -0.3467*** -0.2594*** -0.3141*** -0.3280*** -0.2098*** 
(-4.42) (-4.65) (-3.60) (-4.71) (-4.89) (-3.79) (-4.46) (-4.78) (-3.16) 
ln(GDP) 0.3363*** 0.3376*** 0.3821*** 0.5538*** 0.3363*** 0.3376*** 0.3821*** 0.5539*** 0.3161*** 0.3355*** 0.4024*** 0.534( 
(3.16) (3.21) (3.47) (4.74) (3.37) (3.37) (3.65) (4.92) (3.20) (3.40) 
ln(POP) -0.0311 -0.0309 -0.0311 -0.0309 -0.0512 
(-0.54) (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.53) (-0.95) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.36 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.36 
Adj. R2 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.33 0.55 0.56 0.50 0.33 
System R2 0.86 0.71 
Jarque-Bera 103 6.58 6.95 29.91 31.92 6.58 6.95 29.91 31.92 9.66 11.37 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F) 104 0.98 0.25 0.61 0.55 0.83 0.36 0.67 0.57 0.85 0.31 
Reset (F) 105 1.91 2.54 2.22 0.40 1.91 2.54 2.22 0.40 1.85 2.76 
Note: *, **,***indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
103 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99. 
104 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
105 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
101 
(3.91) (4.9< 
-0.0279 
(-0.50) 
42 42 
0.70 0.5! 
41.91 30.0 
0.65 0.6: 
1.27 0.3! 
Table 4-30 
Openness in Telecommunication and Financial Services and Growth with a Composite Index 
Supply of Financial Services Regression Results: Whole Sample 
Dependent Variable: Number of Banks per 100000 People 
OLS 2SLS 3SLS 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.4744 0.4659 -2.0272*** 0.4744 0.4744 0.4659 -2.0272*** 0.4744 0.6965 1.4349 -1.3218** 
(0.43) (0.43) (-3.01) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) (-3.12) (0.45) (0.67) (1.40) (-2.09) 
ln(GA) -0.2223*** -0.2273*** -0.2223*** -0.2223*** -0.2274*** -0.2223*** -0.2158*** -0.2812*** 
(-2.76) (-2.94) (-2.76) (-2.91) (-3.05) (-2.91) (-2.87) (-3.86) 
Op58"' X ln(GNl89) 0.0222*** 0.0226*** 0.0200** 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0226*** 0.0200** 0.0222*** 0.0188** 0.0183** 0.0111 
(2.79) (2.93) (2.34) (2.79) (2.93) (3.04) (2.43) (2.93) (2.52) (2.50) (1.38) 
-0.0050 -0.0163 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0163 -0.0050 -0.0131 -0.0259 
(-0.28) (-0.86) (-0.28) (-0.29) (-0.89) (-0.29) (-0.85) (-1.50) 
N 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.30 
Adj. R2 0.24 0.26 0.11 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.11 0.24 
System R2 0.86 0.71 0.70 
Jarque-Bera 106 2.44 2.69 3.23 2.44 2.44 2.69 3.23 2.44 2.21 2.52 2.75 
Joint Koenker-Basset (F) 107 0.98 0.25 0.61 0.55 0.83 0.36 0.67 0.57 0.85 0.31 0.65 
Reset ( F) 108 2.18 2.18 2.51 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.51 2.19 0.84 1.37 1.10 
Note:*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1 % respectively. The figures between 
parentheses indicate the values oft-statistics. 
106 The 5% critical value for the Jarque-Bera statistic is 5.99 
107 The 5% critical value for the Koenker-Basset statistic is 2.10. 
108 The 5% critical value for the F statistic is 3.0. 
102 
(4) 
1.6243' 
(1.71) 
-0.2591* 
(-3.80) 
0.0131' 
(1.81) 
-0.0122 
(-0.75) 
42 
0.59 
1.90 
0.62 
0.44 
CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this project was to measure the effects of openness in international 
trade of services on economic growth and to explain the reasons behind the persistent 
existence of barriers for international trade in services. Two sectors were of major 
interest, telecommunications and banking sectors. In order to address those issues, two 
simultaneous econometric models were built and estimated. The first model addressed the 
issue of openness in trade of telecommunication services and incorporated four equations 
accounting for production growth, import, demand and supply of telecommunication 
services. In the second model, the banking sector was added to the telecommunication 
sector and six equations were estimated simultaneously. 
Results showed that openness in trade of services does affect economic growth. 
Whether the effect is beneficial depends on the level of development of each country. 
Low and middle-income countries benefit from openness whereas high-income countries 
do not gain from openness in trade of telecommunication and banking services. We 
hypothesized that the gain in the case of low and middle-income countries was related to 
the spillover of technology from the trading partners to the home country whereas the 
loss in the case of high-income countries was related to the loss in national employment 
due to foreign competition. 
The above results imply that liberalizing international trade in services poses 
substantial challenges to low, middle, and high-income countries. Concerning low and 
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middle-income countries, the benefits from the spillover of technology from the trading 
partners to the home country overcome the loss in national employment when restrictions 
to international trade in services are removed. This result implies that openness in trade 
of services benefit low and middle-income countries. Does this mean that policymakers 
should remove all barriers related to international trade in services? When it comes to 
liberalizing trade in services, policymakers in low and middle-income countries have 
raised many concerns. Among them are the sovereignty of the home country, the loss in 
national employment, and other political concerns. In many instances, countries have 
treated trade negotiations on the basis of reciprocity consideration. One of the difficulties 
in analyzing the cost-benefit of openness of trade in services is to account for all the 
factors that politicians may think of. For instance, it would be very difficult to account for 
and try to quantify, the sovereignty issue, or try to measure all the political factors that 
politicians might use in order to argue against openness in trade of services. However, 
from previous low- and middle-income countries' experiences, the removal of restrictions 
on trade in services has provided considerable welfare gain. As Stephenson (1999) 
mentions, the mixture of deregulation and liberalization in the telecommunication sector 
of Latin American and some Asian countries has improved their network services and 
decreased the cost of their provision. In such cases, both consumers and suppliers would 
benefit from liberalizing trade in services. Therefore, low and middle-income countries 
ought to remove trade barriers related to services subject to certain reservations. 
Liberalizing international trade in services should be implemented by policies that favor 
foreign integration through regulations that would protect the sovereignty as well as the 
domestic economic and political environment of the home country. 
104 
The question of liberalizing international trade in services is more complex with 
regard to high-income countries. Results show that high-income countries do not gain 
from openness in trade of services. However, those results were only statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. We hypothesized that the loss in the case of high-
income countries is related to the decrease in national employment in the services sector 
once barriers to international trade in services have been removed. The reason for this 
loss might be due to services sectors being well developed in high-income countries and 
thus they account for a large share of national income. Any integration with foreign 
competition might result in a loss of national employment. Does this mean that high 
income-countries should not allow any foreign competition in the services sector? The 
answer for this question is more complex than it seems. Not allowing foreign competition 
might result in high domestic market power and the possibility of collusion among 
domestic incumbents. Within such a context, domestic consumers will suffer from a 
decrease in consumer surplus due to an increase in services prices. On the other hand, 
allowing foreign competition might affect negatively economic growth because of the 
loss in national employment. Policymakers in high-income countries should be cautious 
when formulating policies oriented towards openness in trade of services. They should 
consider openness in trade of services with certain reservations. The outcomes of such 
policies should be oriented towards a potential gain in national employment when 
considering the introduction of foreign competition in the domestic market. Such 
potential gain in national employment might be obtained by restricting the flow of 
foreign labor to domestic markets. Certainly, such regulation might incur some welfare 
losses, but policymakers and economists should measure the costs and benefits from 
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those restrictions and decide accordingly whether to remove the barriers to trade in 
services. 
The future of international trade in services depends on research in the fields of 
economics, politics and engineering. All those disciplines should unite their efforts in 
order to ensure a perfect development and application of the WTO agreements. There 
must be a synergy between economics, which promotes the theory of efficiency; politics, 
which promotes sovereignty and diplomatic relations; and engineering, which encourage 
the spread of compatible technology. Certainly, regulatory authorities should implement 
some policies in order to direct and ensure a stable open economy in a global world. 
There remain many extensions and explorations that can be done to this study. 
First our data were limited to 1989-2000 period because of the availability of the 
openness in trade of telecommunication and financial services indices. An extension to 
this study would be to develop indices that take into consideration the time factor. This 
way, the approach to address the issues studied in this project would be oriented towards 
a panel data study instead of a cross-country analysis. With a panel data analysis, time 
and technological change could be incorporated into the model through a time element. 
Second, our study covered 64 countries with dissimilar telecommunication and 
financial industry characteristics. Even within some income groups, the financial and 
telecommunication services sectors were very heterogeneous. Individual country studies 
would give further insights on each nation's specific needs with respect to openness in 
trade of services. 
Third, other variables and interaction terms can be added to this study in order to 
investigate the cross sectoral or cross market effect of openness in trade of services. One 
106 
market of interest might be the labor market. Indeed, adding the labor market to this 
model by estimating a supply and demand equation for domestic labor would allow the 
modeler to estimate the effect of openness in trade of services on the labor market. This 
would give the modeler more assurance about the negative or the positive effects of 
openness in trade of services on the national employment that have been hypothesized 
previously in the analysis. Another sector of interest would be the education sector. 
Education might be added to this study in order to investigate the effect of openness in 
trade of services on education. More specifically, telecommunication might have a 
positive impact on education. 
Fourth, the waiting list variable measures the unmet demand for 
telecommunication services. This might reflect disequilibrium in the market for 
telecommunication services and can be explained by incorporating another behavioral 
equation to the model. 
Fifth, a threshold regression approach can be applied in order to statistically split 
the sample and then investigate whether the level of development affects the impact of 
openness in the services sector on growth. This approach developed by Hansen (1999) 
lets the level of economic development establish the existence as well as the statistical 
significance of a threshold level rather than classifying the countries arbitrarily according 
to their income. However, this method has been applied only to one equation and 
therefore it might not be applicable to a system of simultaneous equations. 
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Low Income 
Benin 
Gambia 
Ghana 
India 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Zimbabwe 
Appendix 1 
Country Coverage by Income Groups 
Lower Middle Upper Middle High Income 
Income Income (OECD) 
Bolivia Argentina Belgium 
Colombia Brazil Canada 
Ecuador Chile Denmark 
Egypt Costa Rica Finland 
El Salvador Gabon France 
Honduras Hungary Germany 
Jamaica Korea Greece 
Morocco Malaysia Iceland 
Peru Mauritius Italy 
Philippines Mexico Japan 
Sri lanka Panama Netherland 
Thailand Poland New Zealand 
Tunisia South Africa Norway 
Uruguay Portugal 
Venezuela Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
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High Income 
(non OECD) 
Cyprus 
Hong Kong 
Israel 
Malta 
Singapore 
Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics and Variable Definition 
Standard 
Variable Description N Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Ga Growth rate of per capita gross national product (1989-2000) 64 0.03157 0.01396 -0.01410 0.06232 
Govb 
Average (1989-2000) government consumption as a 
percentage of GDP 64 15.63 5.01 7.77 29.08 
Average (1989-2000) Inflation rate based on the GDP 
lnfb deflator 64 62.27 209.81 0.57 1197.54 
pop b Average (1989-2000) population growth rate 64 1.47 0.92 -0.34 3.57 
fnVTela 
Average (1989-2000) investment in telecommunication 
infrastructure 64 1.99E+09 4.65E+09 2820302 2.6E+10 
Opb 
Openness in trade measured by the average (1989-2000) 
sum of the imports and exports as a percentage of GDP 64 77.16 54.44 18.02 345.54 
OpTel b Openness index in the telecommunication sector 64 6.03 2.7 9 
GN/89b Per capita gross national product in 1989 64 8355 6932.68 420 24360 
GDPIPOPb Average (1989-2000) Per capita gross domestic product 64 10307.68 8250.66 523.92 27750.5 
pTel a Average (1989-2000) price of telecommunication services 64 502.14 221.94 115.67 1399.11 
MTela 
Average (1989-2000) imports of telecommunication 
equipment 64 8.97E+08 1.8E+09 4519667 1.2E+10 
POPb Average (1989-2000) total population 64 45539366 1.21E+08 266575 9.2E+08 
GOPb Average (1989-2000) gross domestic product 64 4.03E+11 1.02E+12 1.6E+09 7.3E+12 
Ex' Average (1989-2000) exchange rate 64 380.31 1212.19 0.36614 7410.49 
Average (1989-2000) number of telecommunication services 
Sub• subscribers 64 15476066 41156429 23241.4 3E+08 
Average (1989-2000) number of unmet application waiting 
w,• for connection to the public switched network 64 232689.6 472098.5 0 2493016 
GA b Average (1989-2000) geograpghic surface area 64 881265 2008571 320 9970610 
BA/GDP a Total bank assets to gross domestic product ratio 42 135.95 115.91 6 539 
r b Average (1989-2000) real interest rate (in percent) 42 8.7 10.08 -7.65 65.01 
Ba Number of commercial banks per 100,000 people 42 0.91 1.4 0 5.5 
OpFin b Openness index in the financial sector 42 6.67 1.96 8 
OpServ b 
Unweighted average of the openness in financial and 
telecommunication services indices scaled over 10. 42 7.33 2.34 1.18 10 
'Variable treated as endogenous; b Variable treated as exogenous. 
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